Preliminary Report
OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, WEST VIRGINIA, AND MARYLAND.
March 17-September 2, 1862.
No. 2.--Reports of Maj. Gen. John Pope, U. S. Army, of the operations of the Army of Virginia June 26-September 2, with orders and correspondence.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
September 3, 1862.
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following brief sketch of the operations of this army since August 9:
I moved from Sperryville, Little Washington: and Warrenton with the corps of Banks and Sigel and one division of McDowell's corps, numbering in all 32,000 men, to meet the enemy, who had crossed the Rapidan and was advancing on Culpeper.
The movement toward Gordonsville had completely succeeded in drawing off a large force from Richmond and in relieving the Army of the Potomac from much of the danger which threatened its withdrawal from the Peninsula.
The action of August 9 at Cedar Mountain with the forces under Jackson, which compelled his retreat across the Rapidan, made necessary still further re-enforcements of the enemy from Richmond, and by this time, it being apparent that the Army of the Potomac was evacuating the Peninsula, the whole force of the enemy concentrated around Richmond was pushed forward with great rapidity to crush the Army of Virginia before the forces evacuating the Peninsula could be united with it.
I remained at Cedar Mountain and still threatened to cross the Rapidan until August 17, by which time General Robert E. Lee had assembled in my front, and within 3 miles nearly the whole of the rebel army. As soon as I ascertained this fact, and knew that the Army of the Potomac was no longer in danger, I drew back my whole force <ar16_13> across the Rappahannock on the night of the 17th and day of the 18th without loss of any kind, and one day in advance of Lee's proposed movement against me. The enemy immediately appeared in my front at Rappahannock Station and attempted to pass the river at that bridge and the numerous fords above and below, but without success.
The line of the Upper Rappahannock, which I had been ordered to hold, that the enemy might be delayed long enough in his advance upon Washington to enable the forces from the Peninsula to land and effect a junction with me, was very weak, as it could be crossed at almost any point above the railroad bridge by good fords. By constant vigilance and activity, and much severe fighting for three days, the enemy was gradually forced around from the railroad crossing to Waterloo Bridge, west of Warrenton.
Mean time my force had been much diminished by actual loss in battle and by fatigue and exposure, so that, although I had been joined by a detachment under General Reno and the other division of McDowell's corps, my force barely-numbered 40,000 men.
On the 22d a heavy rain fell, which rendered the fords of the river impassable for twenty-four hours. As soon as I discovered this, I concentrated my forces and marched rapidly upon Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge to drive back the forces of the enemy which had succeeded in crossing at those points. This was successfully done and the bridges destroyed.
I passed one day, or rather part of one, at Warrenton and beyond. The enemy still continued to move slowly around along the river, masking every ford with artillery and heavy forces of infantry, so that it was impossible for me to attack him, even with the greatly inferior forces under my command, without passing the river over fords strongly guarded in the face of very superior numbers.
The movement of Jackson toward White Plains and in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap while the main body of the enemy confronted me at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge was well known to me, but I relied confidently upon the forces which I had been assured would be sent from Alexandria, and one strong division of which I had ordered to take post in the works at Manassas Junction. I was entirely under the belief that those would be there, and it was not until I found my communications intercepted that I was undeceived. I knew that this movement was no raid, and that it was made by not less than 25,000 men under Jackson.
By this time the army corps of Heintzelman, about 10,000 strong, had reached Warrenton Junction, one division of it, I think, on the day of the raid; but they came without artillery, with only 40 rounds of ammunition to the man, without wagons, and even the field and general officers without horses.
Fitz John Porter also arrived at Bealeton Station, near Rappahannock, with one of his divisions (4,500 strong), while his other divisions were still at Barnett's and Kelly's Fords.
I directed that corps (about 8,500 strong) to concentrate immediately at Warrenton Junction, where Heintzelman already was. This was accomplished on the evening of the 26th. As soon as it became known to me that Jackson was on the railroad it became apparent that the Upper Rappahannock was no longer tenable. I could not detach a sufficient force to meet Jackson and at the same time attempt to confront the main body of the enemy. I accordingly at once evacuated Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, directing McDowell with his own corps and Sigel's and the division of Reynolds to march rapidly by the <ar16_14> turnpike upon Gainesville, so as to intercept any re enforcements coming to Jackson through Thoroughfare Gap, and instructing Reno, with his command, and Kearny, with one division of Heintzelman's, to march on Greenwich, so as to support McDowell in case of necessity. With Hooker's division, of Heintzelman's corps, I moved back along the railroad upon Manassas Junction. Near Kettle Run Hooker came upon the advance of Ewell's division in the afternoon of the 27th. A severe action took place, which terminated at dark, Ewell being driven from the field with the loss of his camp and 300 killed and wounded.
The unfortunate oversight of not bringing more than 40 rounds of ammunition became at once alarming. At night-fall Hooker had but about 5 rounds to the man left. As soon as I learned this, I sent back orders to Fit z John Porter to march with his corps at I o'clock that night, so as to be with Hooker at daylight in the morning. The distance was only 9 miles, and he received the dispatch at 9.50 o'clock, but did not reach the ground until after 10 o'clock next morning..He can probably explain better than I can the reason of this delay. Fortunately Hooker had handled the enemy so severely the evening before and the movement of McDowell had begun to be so apparent that the enemy, fearful of being surrounded, had retired precipitately from Manassas Junction, directing his retreat through Centreville, as McDowell, Reno, and Kearny had made the road through Gainesville impracticable. I immediately pushed forward to Manassas and thence to Centreville, which was occupied by Kearny that night only a few hours after the enemy had left it. Reno had reached Manassas Junction and Fitz John Porter was immediately ordered up from Broad Run, where he had stopped. McDowell's movement, conducted with vigor and speed, had been completely successful, the enemy being intercepted at Gainesville and part of his forces driven through Thoroughfare Gap. With King's division and Sigel's corps McDowell continued his march along the turnpike toward Centreville, leaving Ricketts, with his division, in observation of Thoroughfare Gap.
Late in the evening of the 28th McDowell's advance (Gibbon's brigade) met the force of Jackson retiring from Centreville and about 6 miles west of that place. A very sharp skirmish took place, ended by the darkness, in which the brigade of Gibbon behaved very handsomely and suffered heavy loss. Sigel was close at hand with his corps, but did not join the action. I instructed Kearny to move forward at early day-dawn from Centreville toward Gainesville, closely followed by Hooker and Reno, and engage the enemy thus placed between McDowell and Sigel on the west, Heintzelman and Reno on the east, and Fitz John Porter on the south. I also instructed F. J. Porter, with his own corps and King's division of McDowell's corps--which had for some reason fallen back from the Warrenton turnpike toward Manassas Junction--to move at daylight in the morning upon Gainesville along the Manassas Gap Railroad until they communicated closely with the forces under Heintzelman and Sigel, cautioning them not to go farther than was necessary to effect this junction, as we might be obliged to retire behind Bull Run that night for subsistence, if nothing else. Heintzelman marched early from Centreville toward Gainesville, closely followed by Reno.
Meantime, shortly after daylight, Sigel, and Reynolds' division of McDowell's corps, had become engaged with the enemy, who was brought to a stand, and he was soon joined by Heintzelman and Reno, and the whole line became actively engaged. Porter marched as directed, followed by King's division, which was by this time joined by <ar16_15> Ricketts' division, which had been forced back from Thoroughfare Gap by the heavy forces of the enemy advancing to support Jackson.
As soon as I found that the enemy had been brought to a halt and was being vigorously attacked along Warrenton turnpike I sent orders to McDowell to advance rapidly on our left and attack the enemy on his flank, extending his right to meet Reynolds' left, and to Fitz John Porter to keep the right well closed on McDowell's left and to attack the enemy in flank and rear while he was pushed in front. This would have made the line of battle of McDowell and Porter at right angles to that of the other forces engaged. The action raged furiously all day, McDowell, although previously in rear of Porter, bringing his whole corps on the field in the afternoon and taking a conspicuous part in that day's operations.
To my surprise and disappointment I received late in the afternoon from Porter a note saying that his advance had met the enemy on the flank in some force, and that he was retiring upon Manassas Junction, without attacking the enemy or coming to the assistance of our other forces, although they were engaged in a furious action only 2 miles distant and in full hearing of him. A portion of his force fell back toward Manassas, and he remained, as he afterward informed me, where he was, looking at the enemy during the whole of the afternoon of Friday and part of Friday night passing down in plain view to reenforce the troops under Jackson without an effort to prevent it or to assist us. One, at least, of his brigades, under General Griffin, got around to Centreville and remained there during the whole of the next day's battle without coming on the field, though in full view of it, while General Griffin himself spent the day in making ill-natured strictures upon the general commanding (see paper marked D) the action in the presence of a promiscuous assemblage.
Darkness closed the action on Friday, the enemy being driven back from his position by Heintzelman's corps and Reno, concluded by a furious attack along the turnpike by King's division, of McDowell's corps, leaving his dead and wounded on the field.
I do not hesitate to say that if the corps of Porter had attacked the enemy on the flank on the afternoon of Friday, as he had my written order (marked B) to do, we should have crushed Jackson before the forces under Lee could have reached him. Why he did not do so I cannot understand.
Our men, much worn down by hard service and continuous fighting for many days previous, and very short of provisions, rested on their arms. Our horses had had no forage for two days. I had telegraphed and written urgently for rations and forage to be sent us, but on Saturday morning before the action was resumed I received a letter (marked A) from General Franklin, written the day previous at Alexandria, stating to me that he had been directed by General McClellan to inform me that rations and forage for my command would be loaded into the cars and available wagons as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them up. All hope of being able to maintain my position, whether victorious or not, vanished with this letter. My cavalry was utterly broken down by long and constant service in the face of the enemy, and, bad as they were, could not be spared from the front, even [if] there had been time to go back 30 miles to Alexandria and await the loading of trains. At the time this letter was written Alexandria was swarming with troops and my whole army interposed between that place and the enemy. I at once understood that we must, if possible, finish what we had to do that day, as night <ar16_16> must see us behind Bull Run if we wished to save men and animals from starvation.
On Friday night I sent a peremptory order (marked C) to General Porter to bring his command on the field and report to me in person within three hours after he received the order. A portion he brought up, but, as I before stated, one of his brigades remained the whole day at Centreville and was not in the engagement.
The enemy's heavy re-enforcements having reached him on Friday afternoon and night, he began to mass on his right for the purpose of crushing our left and occupying the road to Centreville on our rear. His heaviest assault was made about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when, after overwhelming Fitz John Porter and driving his forces back on the center and left, mass after mass of his forces were pushed against our left. A terrific contest with great slaughter was carried on for several hours, our men behaving with firmness and gallantry under the immediate command of General McDowell. When night closed our left hod been forced back about half a mile, but still remained firm and unbroken, while our right held its ground. General Franklin, with his corps, arrived after dark at Centreville, 6 miles in our rear, while Sumner was 4 miles behind Franklin. I could possibly have brought up these corps in the morning in time to have renewed the action, but starvation stared both men and horses in the face, and broken and exhausted as they were they were in no condition to bear hunger also. I accordingly retired to Centreville that night in perfect order.
Neither on Sunday nor on Monday did the enemy make any advance upon us. On Monday I sent to the army corps commanders for their effective strength, which, all told, including Sumner and Franklin, fell short of 60,000 men. Instead of bringing up 30,000 men Franklin and Sumner united fell short 20,000, and these added to the force I had, already wearied and much cut up, did not give me the means to do anything else for a day or two than stand on the defensive. The enemy during Monday again began to work slowly around to our right for the purpose of possessing Fairfax Court-House and thus turning our rear. Couch's division and one brigade of Sumner's had been left there, and I sent over Hooker on Monday afternoon to take command and to post himself at or in front of Germantown, at the same time directing McDowell to take position along the turnpike from Centreville to Fairfax Court-House, about 2 miles west of the latter place. Heintzelman was directed to post himself in rear and support of Reno, who was pushed north of the road, at a point about 2 ½ miles east of Centreville, to cover the turnpike, it being my purpose in the course of the night to mass my command on the right, in the direction of Germantown, where I felt convinced the next attack of the enemy would be made.
Late in the afternoon of Monday the enemy made his demonstration upon Germantown, but was met by Hooker at that place, and by Reno, re-enforced by Kearny, farther west. The battle was very severe, though short, the enemy being driven back a mile with heavy loss, leaving his dead and wounded.
In this short action we lost two of our most valuable and distinguished officers--Generals Kearny and Stevens.
By morning the whole of my command was massed behind Difficult Creek, between Flint Hill and the Warrenton turnpike, with the advance under Hooker in front of Germantown.
With the exception of Sumner, the commanders of the army corps of the Army of the Potomac had continued persistently to inform me that their commands were and had been demoralized ever since they left Harrison's Landing; <ar16_17>  that they had no spirit and no disposition to fight. This latter statement their conduct in the various actions fully contradicted; but the straggling in those corps was distressing. The full facts having been reported to you, I received on Tuesday afternoon the order to retire to the intrenchments near Washington, which was accordingly done on that day and the next in good order and without the slightest loss. Banks, who had been left with the railroad train cut off at Bristoe by the burning of the bridge, was ordered to join me on Monday at Centreville, which he did on the afternoon of that day.
This brief summary will explain sufficiently in detail the whole of the operations of the forces under my command during sixteen days of continuous fighting by day and marching by night. To confront a powerful enemy with greatly inferior forces; to fight him day by day without losing your army; to delay and embarrass his movements, and to force him by persistent resistance to adopt long and circuitous routes to his destination are the duties which have been imposed upon me. They are of all military operations the most difficult and the most harassing, both to the commander and to his troops. How far we have been successful I leave to the judgment of my countrymen. The Armies of Virginia and of the Potomac have been united in the presence and against the efforts of a wary and vigorous enemy, in greatly superior force to either, with no loss for which they did not exact full retribution.
Among the officers whom I feel bound to mention with special gratitude for their most hearty, cordial, and untiring zeal and energy are Generals McDowell, Banks, Reno, Heintzelman, Hooker, and Kearny, and many others of inferior rank, whom I shall take great satisfaction in bringing to the notice of the Government.
The troops have exhibited wonderful patience and courage, and I cannot say too much for them.
Our losses have been very heavy, but so far I have been unable to get accurate returns. I am informed by Generals Kearny and Hooker, who examined the field of battle on Friday, that the enemy's dead and wounded were at least double our own.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
 JNO. POPE,
 Major-General, Commanding.
 General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
[Inclosure A.]
 AUGUST 29, 1862---8 p.m.
 To the COMMANDING OFFICER,
Centreville, Va.:
I have been instructed by General McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available wagons at Alexandria 1oaded with rations for your troops, and all of the cars also, as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the trains.
Respectfully,
 W. B. FRANKLIN. Major-General,
 Commanding Sixth Corps.
«2 R R--VOL XII, PT II» <ar16_18>
[Inclosure B.]
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, IN THE FIELD,
August 29, 1862--4.30 p.m.
 Major-General PORTER:
Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank and, is possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as [you] engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.
 JNO. POPE,
 Major-General, Commanding.
[Inclosure C.]
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, IN THE, FIELD,
Near Bull Run, Va., August 29, 1862---8.50 p.m.
 Maj. Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER:
GENERAL: Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to day and report to me in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its reception or after daybreak to-morrow morning.
 JNO. POPE,
 Major-General, Commanding.
[ Inclosure D. ]
BALL'S CROSS-ROADS, VA..,
September 3, 1862.
Was ordered to Centreville by Major-General Pope on Saturday, August 30. General Griffin arrived there with his command at 11 o'clock, coming from the direction of Manassas Junction. He moved his brigade to the north of the town, halted it, and came to General Pope's headquarters, where he remained one hour, conversing with Lien tenant-Colonel Myers and myself. During this conversation Lieutenant-Colonel Myers asked him several times why his (General Griffin's) brigade was not in the fight. General Griffin replied, "Never mind; I do not care." He said that he was tired of being commanded by staff officers, and asked what Pope had ever done that he should be made a major-general. Also spoke disrespectfully and sneeringly of other superior officers; said that he had heard that morning that General McClellan was to take command; hoped that it was true. He then rode off toward his command, and about two hours after sent an officer to ask whether he could get shoes for his men.
 SPEED BUTLER,
Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.
[Indorsement.]
Forwarded to Colonel Holt, Judge-Advocate-General, U.S. Army. By order of Major-General Halleck:
 J. C. KELTON,
 Assistant Adjutant-General.
 <ar16_19>
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
Near Ball's Cross-Roads, September 3, 1862.
DEAR GENERAL: My whole command retired in good order, and now are encamped between the outer and inner line of intrenchments, except the three corps sent by way of Vienna and Lewinsville to Chain Bridge, from whom I have not yet heard.
I sent a regiment of cavalry this morning to Vienna and beyond to ascertain the movements of the enemy. The rear guards of the forces retiring by the Alexandria pike and by Vienna were fired on with artillery, but not to any considerable extent. The whole command is much broken down, especially that portion of it originally constituting the Army of Virginia, which has done the most harassing service, and has been, without the intermission of a day, fighting the enemy since the 9th of August.
A few days' rest will restore them, and they will then be capable of rendering good service, although greatly reduced in numbers.
Banks' corps does not exceed 6,000, McDowell's 11,000, and Sigel's 6,000. There are, of course, many stragglers, who will swell these numbers considerably within a few days.
Of those portions of the Army of the Potomac which have joined me (excepting Sumner's and Franklin's, of which I know little) not much can be expected. They are listless and dejected, and straggle in a manner which is distressing. Not more, certainly, than one-half of those reported effective can ever be brought into action, and even those that can be do not manifest the least spirit.
Reno's command is a very fine one, but does not exceed 6,000. Sumner and Franklin arrived too late to be of service, as the army had been cut up and wearied to death before they reached Centreville.
I have much to say and to report to you concerning the conduct of certain officers and their commands during these operations, which I will postpone for the present. There is no doubt in the mind of any man here that the battle of Groveton would have been a decisive and complete victory on the first day had General Porter advanced as I directed him. Why he did not is yet unexplained. The whole of the heavy re-enforcements which attacked us on Saturday passed down the road from Gainesville during the whole afternoon and night of Friday, while General Porter remained in full sight of them, on their flank, between Manassas Junction and Gainesville, although he had my positive written order to attack them in flank while I was urging the battle in front. He made no attack whatever, but retired a portion of his command, at least, to Manassas, which was not near enough the next day to take any part in the action.
This is the second time since it has been with me that the delay of this same corps has hazarded the safety and success of our movements. The constant complaint is that the men are broken down, though what marching or other hard service they have done for a 1ong time I do not know.
I will state these facts officially within a day or two, or as soon as I can find a moment to make my report.
I have done the best I possibly could with the materials furnished me, as I am very sure you know. Some definite arrangements, it seems to me, ought to be made about command here. Troops assigned to different commanders are much mixed up by the efforts to place each division and brigade on the ground formerly occupied by them. It would be greatly more satisfactory to everybody if you would command the whole direct from Washington, assigning certain portions of the <ar16_20> line to officers selected for the purpose. As matters now stand they are a little embarrassing, especially so to me, as I do not know how far I am responsible for outpost or picket service or for movements to feel the enemy, which should be made every day. I do not believe that any attack will be made on these works, but that some movement against Maryland, and perhaps Pennsylvania, is intended. The whole tendency of the enemy has been in that direction.
I telegraphed you last night and will do so again as soon as the last part of my command is in position. I shall remain here until I hear from you The telegraph station nearest me is Upton's Hill.
I am, general, very truly, your friend,
 JNO. POPE.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
 
 
Pope’s Final Report
NEW YORK, January 27, 1863.
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the army under my command during the late campaign in Virginia:
Several of the reports of the corps commanders have not yet reached me, but so much time has elapsed since the termination of the campaign that I do not feel at liberty to withhold this report longer. The strange misapprehension of facts concerning this campaign, which, though proceeding from irresponsible sources, has much possessed the public mind, makes it necessary for me to enter more into detail than I should otherwise have done, and to embody in the report such of the dispatches and orders sent and received as will make clear every statement which is contained in it.
On the 26th day of June, 1862, by special order of the President of the United States, I was assigned to the command of the Army of Virginia. That army was constituted as follows: First Corps, under Major-General Frémont; Second Corps, under Major-General Banks; Third Corps, under Major-General McDowell. In addition to these three corps a small and unorganized force, under Brigadier-General Sturgis, was posted in the neighborhood of Alexandria, and was then in process of being organized for field service. The forces in the intrenchments around Washington were also placed under my command. All the disposable movable forces consisted of the three corps first named. Their effective strength of infantry and artillery, as reported to me, was as follows: Frémont's corps, 11,500 strong; Banks' corps, reported at 14,500, but in reality only about 8,000; McDowell's corps, 18,500; making a total of 38,000 men. The cavalry numbered about 5,000 men for duty, but most of it was badly mounted and armed and in poor condition for service. These forces were scattered over a wide district of country, not within supporting distance of each other, and many of the brigades and divisions were badly organized and in a demoralized condition. This was particularly the case with the army corps of Major-General Frémont, a sad report of which was made to me by General Sigel when he relieved General Frémont in command of the corps.
My first labors were directed to the reorganization of some of the divisions and brigades of that corps and to supplying the whole force with much of the material absolutely necessary for troops in the corps.
The corps of Banks and Frémont were in the valley of the Shenandoah, <ar16_21> between Winchester and Middletown, the bulk of the forces being in the vicinity of the latter place. One division of McDowell's corps was at Manassas Junction, with its advance thrown forward to Catlett's Station. The other division was posted in the vicinity of Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg.
When I first assumed command of these forces the troops under Jackson had retired from the valley of the Shenandoah and were in rapid march toward Richmond, so that at that time there was no force of the enemy of any consequence within a week's march of any of the troops assigned to my command.
It was the wish of the Government that I should cover the city of Washington from any attacks from the direction of Richmond, make such dispositions as were necessary to assure the safety of the valley of the Shenandoah, and at the same time so operate upon the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to draw off, if possible, a considerable force of the enemy from Richmond, and thus relieve the operations against that city of the Army of the Potomac.
The first object I had in view was to concentrate, as far as possible, all the movable forces under my command and to establish them in such positions as best to effect the objects set forth. It seemed to me that the security of the Shenandoah Valley was not best attained by posting troops within the valley itself, but that the necessary results could be better accomplished and the other objects with which I was charged best promoted by concentrating these forces at some point or points from which, if any attempts were made to enter the valley of the Shenandoah from Richmond, I should be able by rapid marching to interpose between such force and the main body of the enemy and cut off its retreat. I felt confident, and this confidence was justified by subsequent results, that no considerable force of the enemy would attempt to enter the valley of the Shenandoah while the forces under my command were so posted as to be able without difficulty to intercept its retreat and fall upon its rear. I accordingly sent orders to Major-General Sigel, commanding the First Corps, to move forward from Middletown, cross the Shenandoah at Front Royal, and, pursuing the west side of the Blue Ridge, to take post at Sperryville by passing through Luray Gap. At the same time I directed Major-General Banks, crossing the Shenandoah at the same point, to move forward and take post between 6 and 10 miles east of Sperryville. General McDowell was ordered to move Ricketts' division of his corps from Manassas Junction to Waterloo Bridge, the point where the turnpike from Warrenton to Sperryville crosses the Upper Rappahannock; King's division, of the same corps, it was thought best to leave at Fredericksburg to cover the crossing of the Rappahannock at that point, and to protect the railroad thence to Aquia Creek and the public buildings which had been erected at the latter place. While I yielded to this wish of the War Department, the wide separation of this division from the main body of the army and the ease with which the enemy would be able to interpose between them engaged my earnest attention and gave me very serious uneasiness.
Whilst these movements were in progress commenced the series of battles which preceded and attended the retreat of General McClellan from the Chickahominy toward Harrison's Landing. When first General McClellan began to intimate by his dispatches that he designed making this movement toward James River I suggested to the President of the United States the impolicy of such a movement and the <ar16_22> serious consequences which would be likely to result from it, and urged upon him that he should send orders to General McClellan that if he were unable to maintain his position on the Chickahominy, and were pressed by superior forces of the enemy, to mass his whole force on the north side of that stream, even at the risk of losing much material of war, and endeavor to make his way in the direction of Hanover Court. House; but in no event to retreat with his army farther to the south than the White House on York River. I stated to the President that the retreat to James River was carrying General McClellan away from any re-enforcements that could possibly be sent him within a reasonable time, and was absolutely depriving him of any substantial aid from the forces under my command; that by this movement the whole army of the enemy would be interposed between his army and mine, and that they would then be at liberty to strike in either direction, as they might consider it most advantageous; that this movement to James River would leave entirely unprotected, except in so far as the small force under my command was able to protect it, the whole region in front of Washington, and that it would therefore be impossible to send any of the forces under my command to re-enforce General McClellan without rendering it certain that the enemy, even in the worst case for themselves, would have the privilege and power of exchanging Richmond for Washington City; that to them the loss of Richmond would be trifling, whilst the loss of Washington to us would be conclusive, or nearly so, in its results upon this war. I was so deeply impressed with these views that I repeatedly and earnestly urged them upon the President and Secretary of War. After General McClellan had taken up his position at Harrison's Landing I addressed him a letter, stating to him my position and the distribution of the troops under my command, and requesting him in all earnestness and good faith to write me fully and freely his views, and to suggest to me any measures which he thought desirable to enable me to cooperate with him or to render any assistance in my power in the operations of the army under his command. I stated to him that I had no object except to assist his operations, and that I would undertake any labor and run any risk for that purpose. I therefore desired him to feel no hesitation in communicating freely with me, as he might rest assured that every suggestion that he would make would meet all respect and consideration at my hands, an(l that, so far as it was in my power to do so, I would carry out his wishes with all energy and with all the means at my command. In reply to this communication I received a letter from General McClellan, very general in its terms, and proposing nothing toward the accomplishment of the purpose I had suggested to him. It became apparent that, considering the situation in which the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia were placed in relation to each other, and the absolute necessity of harmonious and prompt co-operation between them, some military superior both of General McClellan and myself should be called to Washington and placed in command of all the operations in Virginia.
In accordance with these views Major-General Halleck was called to Washington and placed in general command. Many circumstances, which it is not necessary here to set forth, induced me to express to the President, to the Secretary of War, and to General Halleck my desire to be relieved from the command of the Army of Virginia and to be returned to the Western country.
My services, however, were considered necessary in the projected campaign, and my wishes were not complied with. I accordingly took the field in Virginia with grave forebodings of the result, but with a <ar16_23> determination to carry out the plans of the Government with all the energy and with all the ability of which I was master.
Previous to taking the field I issued the following orders, which set out very fully the policy which I considered advisable, and which at that time received the sanction of the Government, and, so far as I know, the approval of the country.
The order requiring the troops to subsist upon the country in which their operations were conducted has, with a willful disregard of its terms, been construed, greatly to my discredit, as authorizing indiscriminate robbery and plunder; yet the terms of this order are so specific as to the manner and by whom all property or subsistence needed for the use of the army should be seized, and the order is so common in the history of warfare, that I have been amazed that it could have been so misinterpreted and misunderstood. It is therefore submitted here for the calm examination of the Government and of the public.
I believed then and believe now that the policy there laid down was wise and just, and was well calculated to secure efficient and rapid operations of the army, and, in case of reverse, to leave the enemy without the means of subsisting in the country over which our army had passed, and over which any pursuit must be conducted. The long delay and embarrassment of the army under General Lee, in its subsequent movements toward Washington, occasioned largely by the want of supplies taken from the country under this order, fully justified its wisdom.
It was determined, before I left Washington to take the field in Virginia, that the union of the Armies of Virginia and of the Potomac was absolutely essential both to the safety of the national capital and to the further successful prosecution of the operations against Richmond. The mission of the army under my command, therefore, was to cover as far as possible the front of Washington and make secure the valley of the Shenandoah, and so operate upon the enemy's lines of communication to the west and northwest as to force him to make such heavy detachments from his main force at Richmond as would enable the Army of the Potomac to withdraw from its position at Harrison's Landing and to take shipping for Aquia Creek or for Alexandria. If, as was feared, the enemy should throw his whole force in the direction of Washington, it became my duty to resist his advance at all hazards, and so to delay and embarrass his movements as to gain all the time possible for the arrival of the Army of the Potomac behind the Rappahannock. Meantime, before the arrival of General Halleck, I instructed General King, at Fredericksburg, to send forward detachments of his cavalry to operate upon the line of the Virginia Central Railroad, and as far as possible to embarrass and destroy communication between Richmond and the valley of the Shenandoah. Several cavalry expeditions which that officer dispatched for the purpose were completely successful, and succeeded in breaking up the railroad at several points upon several occasions. At the same time I directed Major-General Banks to send forward an infantry brigade with all his cavalry to march rapidly upon Culpeper Court-House, and after taking possession of that place to push forward cavalry toward the Rapidan, in the direction of Gordonsville. On the 14th of July, after this movement was successfully accomplished, I directed General Banks to push forward during the night of that day the whole of his cavalry force, under Brigadier-General Hatch, from Culpeper, with orders to take possession of Gordonsville, and to destroy the railroad for 10 or 15 <ar16_24> miles east of that place with a portion of his forces, whilst all remaining pushed forward in the direction of Charlottesville, destroying the railroad bridges and interrupting that line of communication as far as practicable.
At that time there was no force of the enemy at Gordonsville or in the vicinity, and the whole operation as ordered was not only easily practicable, but would have been attended with serious consequences to the enemy; but, to my surprise and dissatisfaction, I received, on the 17th of July, from General Banks, a report that General Hatch had taken with him infantry, artillery, and trains of wagons, and that, in consequence of bad roads, he had at that date only succeeded in going as far as Madison Court-House. Meantime, on the 16th of July, the advance of Jackson's forces under Ewell had reached Gordonsville, and the proposed movements as ordered became impracticable. No satisfactory explanation has ever been made to me of this departure from my orders on the part of General Hatch. Finding it no longer practicable to occupy Gordonsville as I had designed, I sent orders to General Banks to direct General Hatch to select from his own cavalry and that of General McDowell, which I had sent forward. 1,500 to 2,000 of the best mounted men, and to proceed from Madison Court-House around the west side of the Blue Ridge to a point whence he could make an easy descent upon the railroad west of Gordonsville, and, if successful, to push forward to Charlottesville, and, if possible, destroy the railroad between that place and Lynchburg. In compliance with this order, General Hatch commenced to make the movement as directed, but abandoned it soon after he started, and returned by the way of Sperryville to his post. As soon as I had received the report of this second failure I relieved General Hatch from the command of the cavalry of General Banks' corps, and sent Brigadier-General Buford to report to General Banks as the chief of cavalry of his corps.
On the 29th of July I left Washington, and after reviewing Ricketts' division, of McDowell's corps, at Waterloo Bridge, repaired to the headquarters of General Banks, a few miles southeast of Little Washington. All preparations having been completed, I instructed General Banks to move forward on the 7th of August and take post at the point where the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper crosses Hazel River. General McDowell was ordered on the day previous to move forward with Ricketts' division from Waterloo Bridge to Culpeper Court-House, so that on the 7th of August all the infantry and artillery forces of the Army of Virginia were assembled along the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper, and numbered about 28,500 men. King's division, as I have before stated, was left on the Lower Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, and was not then available for active operations in the direction of Gordonsville.
The cavalry forces covering the front of the army on that day were distributed as follows: General Buford, with five regiments, was posted at Madison Court-House, with his pickets along the line of the Rapidan from Barnett's Ford as far west as the Blue Ridge. General Sigel had been directed to post a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery at the point where the road from Madison Court-House to Sperryville crosses Robertson's River, as a support to the cavalry of General Buford in front of him. General Bayard, with four regiments of cavalry, was posted near Rapidan Station, the point where the Orange and Alexandria road crosses Rapidan River, with his pickets extended as far to the east as Raccoon Ford, and connecting with General Buford on his right at Barnett's Ford. From Raccoon Ford to the forks of the Rappahannock  <ar16_25> above Falmouth the Rapidan was lined with cavalry pickets. On the top of Thoroughfare Mountain, about half way between Generals Bayard and Buford, was established a signal station, which overlooked the whole country as far south as Orange Court-House.
On the 7th I proceeded to Sperryville and inspected the corps of Major-General Sigel. I remained at Sperryville until 4 o'clock on the afternoon of that day, during which time I received several reports from the front that the enemy was crossing the Rapidan at several points between the railroad crossing of that river and Liberty Mills. I reached Culpeper Court-House on the morning of the 8th of August. The town had been occupied for several days by Crawford's brigade, of General Banks' corps, and on the 7th Ricketts' division, of McDowell's corps, had also reached there from Waterloo Bridge. During the whole of the morning of the 8th I continued to receive reports from General Bayard, who was slowly falling back in the direction of Culpeper CourtHouse from the advance of the enemy, and from General Buford, who also reported the enemy advancing in heavy force upon Madison CourtHouse. My instructions required me to be careful and keep my communications good with Fredericksburg, and by no means to permit the enemy to interpose between me and that place. Although during the whole of the 8th of August it was very doubtful, from the reports of Generals Bayard and Buford, whether the enemy's movement was in the direction of Madison Court-House or of Culpeper, I considered it advisable, in view of my relations with Fredericksburg, to concentrate my whole force in the direction of Culpeper, so as to keep myself constantly interposed between the main body of the enemy and the lower fords of the Rappahannock. Early in the day I pushed forward Crawford's brigade, of Banks corps, in the direction of Cedar, or Slaughter, Mountain, to support General Bayard, who was falling slowly back in that direction, and to assist him as far as practicable in determining the movements and the forces of the enemy. I sent orders also to General Banks to move forward promptly from Hazel River to Culpeper Court. House, and also to General Sigel to march at once from Sperryville to the same place. To my surprise I received after night on the 8th a note from General Sigel, dated at Sperryville at 6.30 that afternoon, asking me by what road he should march to Culpeper Court-House. As there was but one road between those two points, and that a broad stone turnpike, I was at a loss to understand how General Sigel could entertain any doubt as to the road by which he should march. This doubt, however, delayed the arrival of his Corps at Culpeper CourtHouse several hours, and rendered it impracticable for that corps to be pushed to the front, as I had designed, on the afternoon of the next day.
Early on the morning of the 9th of August I directed General Banks to move forward toward Cedar Mountain with his whole corps, and to join the brigade of that corps, under General Crawford, which had been pushed forward on the day previous. I directed General Banks to take up a strong position at or near the point occupied by that brigade, to check the advance of the enemy, and to determine his forces and the character of his movement as far as practicable. The consolidated report of General Banks' corps, received some days previously, exhibited an effective force of something over 14,000 men. Appended to this report will be found the return in question. It appeared subsequently, however, that General Banks' forces at that time did not exceed 8,000 men; but although I several times called General Banks' attention to the discrepancy between this return and the force he afterward <ar16_26> stated to me he had led to the front, that discrepancy has never been explained, and I do not yet understand how General Banks could have been so greatly mistaken as to the forces under his immediate command. I directed him, when he went forward from Culpeper CourtHouse, that if the enemy advanced to attack him in the strong position which I had instructed him to take up, he should push his skirmishers well to the front and notify me immediately. Three miles in his rear, and within easy supporting distance, Ricketts' division, of General McDowell's corps, had been posted at the point where the road from Madison Court-House to Culpeper intersects the road from Culpeper to Cedar Mountain. This division was so posted because it was not certain whether a considerable force of the enemy was not advancing on Culpeper from the direction of Madison Court.House, General Buford having reported to me very early on the morning of the 9th from Madison Court-House that the enemy was in heavy force on his right, his left, and partly on his rear, and that he was retreating in the direction of Sperryville.
Desultory artillery firing had been kept up all day on the 9th in the direction of General Banks' corps, but I continued to receive during the whole of that day reports from General Banks that no considerable force of the enemy except cavalry had come forward, and that though the cavalry had been ostentatiously displayed he did not believe that the enemy was in sufficient force to make any attack upon him. As late as 5 o'clock in the afternoon General Banks wrote me substantially to the same effect, but before I had received this last note the artillery firing had become so rapid and continuous that I feared a general engagement was going on or might be brought on at any moment. I therefore instructed General McDowell to move forward Ricketts' division rapidly to the field and accompanied that division myself. At no time during the day did General Banks express any apprehensions of attack in force by the enemy, nor did he ask nor intimate that he needed re-enforcements.
General Sigel's corps began to march into Culpeper Court-House late in the afternoon, and just as I was leaving that place, having been delayed several hours by General Sigel's singular uncertainty as to what road he ought to pursue. I had given orders a number of days previously that all the troops belonging to the Army of Virginia should be ready to march at the shortest notice and should habitually keep two days' cooked rations in their haversacks.Notwithstanding this order, General Sigel's corps arrived in Culpeper without any rations, and was unable to move forward until provisions could be procured from McDowell's train and cooked at Culpeper Court-House.
I have received no report from General Banks of his operations at Cedar Mountain, but I had sent forward Brigadier-General Roberts, chief of cavalry, of my staff, and had directed him to report to General Banks in the early part of the day of the 9th, and to advise freely with him as to the operations of his corps. General Roberts, as well as General Banks, was fully advised of my wishes, and that I desired General Banks merely to keep the enemy in check by occupying a strong position in his front until the whole of the disposable forces under my command should be concentrated in the neighborhood. General Roberts reported to me that he had conferred freely with General Banks and urgently represented to him my purposes, but that General Banks, contrary to his suggestions and to my wishes, had left the strong position which he had taken up and had advanced at least a mile to assault the enemy, believing that they were not in considerable <ar16_27> force, and that he would be able to crush their advance before their main body could come up from the direction of the Rapidan. He accordingly threw forward his whole corps into action, against superior forces of the enemy strongly posted and sheltered by woods and ridges. His advance led him over the open ground, which was everywhere swept by the fire of the enemy, concealed in the woods and ravines beyond. Notwithstanding these disadvantages his corps gallantly responded to his orders and assaulted the enemy with great fury and determination. The action lasted about an hour and a half, and during that time our forces suffered heavy loss, and were gradually driven back to their former position, at which point, just at dusk, Ricketts' division, of McDowell's corps, came up and joined in the engagement.
As soon as I arrived on the field at the head of Ricketts' division I directed General Banks to draw in his right, which was much extended, and to mass the whole of his right wing at the center of his line, pushing forward at the same time Ricketts' division to occupy the ground thus vacated. The enemy followed Banks as he retired with great caution, and emerging from the woods, which had sheltered him all day, attempted to push forward to the open ground in front of our new line. A sharp artillery engagement immediately commenced, when the enemy was driven back to the woods, principally by the batteries of Ricketts' division.
The artillery firing was kept up until near midnight of the 9th. Finding that Banks' corps had been severely cut up and was much fatigued I drew it back to the rear and pushed forward the corps of Sigel, which had begun to arrive, to occupy the woods on the left of the road, with a wide space of open ground in his front. Ricketts' division was also drawn back to the cover of the woods and behind the ridges in the open ground on the right of Sigel. These dispositions were completed about daybreak on the morning of the 10th. Banks' corps, reduced to about 5,000 men, was so cut up and worn down with fatigue that I did not consider it capable of rendering any efficient service for several days. I therefore directed General Banks, or, in his absence, General Williams, who succeeded to the command, to assemble his corps on the road to Culpeper Court-House, and about 2 miles in rear of our front; to collect his stragglers, send back his wounded to Culpeper Court-House, and proceed as rapidly as possible to put the corps in condition for service.
In consequence of the vigorous resistance of the night previous, and the severe loss of the enemy in attempting to advance, before daylight of the 10th Jackson drew back his forces toward Cedar Mountain, about 2 miles from our front. Our pickets were immediately pushed forward, supported by Milroy's brigade, and occupied the ground.
The day of the 10th was intensely hot, and the troops on both sides were too much fatigued to renew the action. My whole effective force on that day, exclusive of Banks' corps, which was in no condition for service, war about 20,000 artillery and infantry and about 2,000 cavalry. General Buford, with the cavalry force under his command, not yet having been able to join the main body, I had telegraphed General King at Fredericksburg to move forward on the 8th by the lower fords of the Rappahannock and Stevensburg to join me. A large part of his command had just returned from a very fatiguing expedition against the Central Railroad, but he marched forward promptly, and joined the main body late in the evening of the 11th. The whole day was spent by both armies in burying the dead and in bringing off the wounded.
Although, even after King joined me, my whole effective force was <ar16_28> barely equal to that of the enemy, I determined, after giving King's division one night's rest, to fall upon him at daylight on the 12th on his line of communication, and compel him to fight a battle, which must have been entirely decisive for one army or the other. But during the night of the 11th Jackson evacuated his position in front of us and retreated rapidly across the Rapidan in the direction of Gordonsville, leaving many of his dead and wounded on the field and along the road from Cedar Mountain to Orange Court-House. No material of war nor baggage trains were lost on either side, but the loss of life on both sides was severe. Brigadier-Generals Geary, Augur, and Carroll were badly wounded, and Brigadier-General Prince was captured by accident. Very many of our best field and company officers were killed or wounded. From the verbal reports and statements of General Banks and others the Massachusetts regiments behaved with especial gallantry and sustained the heaviest losses, but the conduct of the whole corps of General Banks was beyond all praise. Although I regret that General Banks thought it expedient to depart from my instructions, it gives me pleasure to bear testimony to his gallant and intrepid conduct throughout that action. He exposed himself as freely as any one under his command, and his example went far to secure that gallant and noble conduct which has made his corps famous. Generals Geary, Augur, Carroll, Gordon, and Greene behaved with distinguished gallantry. General Prince, who had led his brigade throughout the action with coolness and courage, was captured after dark whilst passing from one flank of his command to the other. As I have not received any report from General Banks, it is not in my power to mention the field and company officers who distinguished themselves under his immediate eye in this action, but as soon as his report is received I will transmit it to the Government, and endeavor to do justice to every officer and soldier who belonged to his corps. Brigadier-General Roberts, chief of cavalry, of my staff, accompanied General Banks throughout the day, and rendered most important and gallant service.
No report of killed and wounded has been made to me by General Banks; I can therefore only form an approximation of our losses in that battle. Our killed, wounded, and prisoners amounted to about 1,800 men,(*) besides which fully 1,000 men straggled back to Culpeper Court-House and beyond, and never entirely returned to their commands. A strong cavalry force, under Generals Buford and Bayard, pursued the enemy to the Rapidan and captured many stragglers. The cavalry forces immediately resumed their original positions, and again occupied the Rapidan from Raccoon Ford to the base of the Blue Ridge. On the 14th of August General Reno, with 8,000 men of the forces which had arrived at Falmouth, under General Burnside, joined me. I immediately pushed forward my whole force in the direction of the Rapidan, and occupied a strong position, with my right, under Major General Sigel, resting on Robertson's River, where the road from Cedar Mountain to Orange Court-House crosses that stream; my center, under General McDowell, occupying both flanks of Cedar Mountain, and my left, under General Reno, a position near Raccoon Ford, and covering the road from that ford to Stevensburg and Culpeper. I began immediately again to operate with my cavalry upon the enemy's communications with Richmond. From the 12th to the 18th of August reports were constantly reaching me of large forces of the enemy re-enforcing Jackson from the direction of Richmond, and by the morning of the 18th I <ar16_29> became satisfied that nearly the whole force of the enemy from Rich-mend was assembling in my front, along the south side of the Rapidan, and extending from Raccoon Ford to Liberty Mills.
The cavalry expeditions sent out on the 16th in the direction of Louisa Court-House captured the adjutant-general of General Stuart, and was very near capturing that officer himself. Among the papers taken was an autograph letter of General Robert E. Lee to General Stuart, dated Gordonsville, August 13,which made manifest to me the position and force of the enemy and their determination to overwhelm the army under my command before it could be re-enforced by any portion of the Army of the Potomac. I held on to my position thus far to the front for the purpose of affording all time possible for the arrival of the Army of the Potomac at Aquia Creek and Alexandria and to embarrass and delay the movements of the enemy as far as practicable. On the 18th of August it became apparent to me that this advanced position, with the small force under my command, was no longer tenable in the face of the overwhelming forces of the enemy. I determined, accordingly, to withdraw behind the Rappahannock with all speed, and, as I had been instructed, to defend, as far as practicable, the line of that river, I directed Major-General Reno to send back his trains on the morning of the 18th, by the way of Stevensburg, to Kelly's or Barnett's Ford, and, as soon as the trains had gotten several hours in advance, to follow them with his whole corps, and take post behind the Rappahannock, leaving all his cavalry in the neighborhood of Raccoon Ford to cover this movement. General Banks' corps, which had been ordered on the 12th to take position at Culpeper Court-House,I directed, with its trains preceding it, to cross the Rappahannock at the point where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses that river. General McDowell's train was ordered to pursue the same route, while the train of General Sigel was directed through Jefferson, to cross the Rappahannock at Warrenton Sulphur Springs. So soon as these trains had been sufficiently advanced McDowell's corps was directed to take the route from Culpeper to Rappahannock Ford, whilst General Sigel, who was on the right and front, was instructed to follow the movements of his train to Sulphur Springs. These movements were executed during the day and night of the 18th and the day of the 19th, by which time the whole army, with its trains, had safely recrossed the Rappahannock, and was posted behind that stream, with its left at Kelly's Ford and its right about 3 miles above Rappahannock Station, General Sigel having been directed immediately upon crossing at Sulphur Springs to march down the left bank of the Rappahannock until he connected closely with General McDowell's right.
Early on the morning of the 20th the enemy drove in our pickets in front of Kelly's Ford and at Rappahannock Station, but finding we had covered those fords, and that it would be impracticable to force the passage of the river without heavy loss, his advance halted, and the main body of his army was brought forward from the Rapidan. By the night of the 20th the bulk of his forces confronted us from Kelly's Ford to a point above our extreme right. During the whole of the days of the 2ist and 22d efforts were made by the enemy at various points to cross the river, but they were repulsed in all cases. The artillery fire was rapid and continuous during the whole of those days, and extended along the line of the river for 7 or 8 miles. Finding that it was not practicable to force the passage of the river in my front, the enemy began slowly to move up the river for the purpose of turning our right. My orders required me to keep myself closely in communication <ar16_30> with Fredericksburg, to which point the Army of the Potomac was being brought from the Peninsula., with the purpose of re-enforcing me from that place by the line of the Rappahannock. My force was too small to enable me to extend my right farther without so weakening my line as to render it easy for the enemy to break through at any point. I telegraphed again and again to Washington, representing this movement of the enemy toward my right and the impossibility of my being able to extend my lines so as to resist it without abandoning my connections with Fredericksburg.
I was assured on the 21st that if I would hold the line of the river two days longer I should be so strongly re-enforced as not only to be secure, but to be able to resume offensive operations; but on the 25th of August the only forces that had joined me or were in the neighborhood were 2,500 men of the Pennsylvania Reserves, under Brigadier-General Reynolds, who had arrived at Kelly's Ford, and the division of General Kearny, 4,500 strong, which had reached Warrenton Junction. The line of the Rappahannock is very weak, and scarce opposes any considerable obstacle to the advance of an army. It is but a small stream above the forks, and can be crossed by good fords every mile or two of its whole length. The movement of the enemy toward my right occasioned me much uneasinesss, in consequence of the instructions which bound me to keep in close communication with Fredericksburg, but I instructed General Sigel, who occupied the right of my line and who expressed great apprehensions that his flank would be turned and proposed to withdraw from his position toward the railroad, to stand firm and hold his ground, and to allow the enemy to cross at Sulphur Springs and develop himself on the road toward Warrenton; that as soon as any considerable force had crossed at that place I would rapidly mass my army during the night and throw it upon any force of the enemy which attempted to march in the direction of Warrenton. The whole of the cavalry, under Brigadier-Generals Buford and Bayard, was pushed considerably to the right of General Sigel, in the direction of Fayetteville and Sulphur Springs, to watch the movements of the enemy in that direction, and to picket the river as far up as possible. General Sigel was ordered, if any force of the enemy attempted to cross below Sulphur Springs, to march at once against it and to notify me, as I was determined to resist the passage of the river at any point below the Springs. Copies of my dispatches to the General-in-Chief and of his replies, the dispatches from General Sigel and my orders to him, given during the 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d of August, are appended, which show completely the condition of things, my understanding of the movements of the enemy, and the dispositions which I made and proposed to make in relation to them.
Finding that the continued movement of the enemy to my right, whilst heavy masses of his force still confronted me at Rappahannock Station, would within a day, if allowed to continue, either render my position on the Rappahannock wholly untenable or force me to give battle to the enemy in my front and on my right, I determined on the afternoon of the 22d to mass my whole force to recross the Rappahannock by the bridges and fords near Rappahannock Station and by Kelly's Ford below, and to fall on the flank and rear of the long column of the enemy which was passing up the river toward our right.
I accordingly made the necessary orders on the night of the 22d of A August The attempt would have been dangerous, but no recourse was left me except to make this attack, to retire to Warrenton Junction and abandon the line of the Rappahannock, or to retire in the direction of <ar16_31> Fredericksburg and abandon the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and the direct approaches to Washington City. I determined, therefore, to hazard the result and to fall furiously with my whole army upon the flank and rear of the enemy. During the night of the 22d a heavy rain set in, which before day dawned on the 23d had caused the river to rise 6 or 8 feet, carried away all our bridges, and destroyed all the fords on the river. To recross the Rappahannock and to make the attack as proposed was no longer practicable, but the rise in the river which had prevented the movement I believed also would prevent the retreat of that portion of the enemy which had crossed at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, according to the reports which had been sent me by General Sigel.
Early on the morning of the 23d, therefore, I massed my whole force in the neighborhood of Rappahannock Station, with the purpose of falling upon that portion of the enemy which had crossed above me and was then supposed to be between Sulphur Springs, Waterloo Bridge, and the town of Warrenton. As the river was too high to be crossed, and was likely to remain so for at least thirty-six hours, I had no fear that the enemy would be able to interpose between me and Fredericksburg or to make any attempt upon the Orange and Alexandria Railroad north of the Rappahannock. I directed General Sigel to march with his whole corps upon Sulphur Springs, supported by Reno's corps and Banks' corps, to fall upon any body of the enemy that he might encounter, and to push forward along the river to Waterloo Bridge. I directed General McDowell to move at the same time directly upon the town of Warrenton, so that from that point he would be able, if necessary, to unite with General Sigel on the road from that place to Sulphur Springs or to Waterloo Bridge. To the corps of General McDowell I had attached the Pennsylvania Reserves, under Brigadier-General Rey nolds--the first of the Army of the Potomac which had joined my command.
On the night of the 22d of August a small cavalry force of the enemy crossing at Waterloo Bridge and passing through Warrenton, had made a raid upon our trains at Catlett's Station, and had destroyed four of five wagons in all, belonging to the train of my own headquarters. At the time this cavalry force attacked at Catlett's---and it certainly was not more, than 300 strong--our whole army trains were parked at that place, and were guarded by not less than 1,500 infantry and five companies of cavalry. The success of this small cavalry party of the enemy, although very trifling and attended with but little damage, was most disgraceful to the force which had been left in charge of the trains. General Sigel moved, as ordered, slowly up the Rappahannock in the direction of Sulphur Springs on the 23d, and first encountered a force of the enemy near the point where a small creek, called Great Run, puts into the Rappahannock, about 2 miles below the Sulphur Springs. The enemy was driven across the stream, but destroyed the bridges. The heavy rains had caused this small creek to rise so much that it was not then fordable, so that the night of the 23d and part of the morning of the 24th were spent by General Sigel in rebuilding the bridges. On the night of the 23d also the advance of McDowell's corps occupied Warrenton, a cavalry force of the enemy having retreated from there a few hours before.
On the morning of the 24th General Sigel, supported by Generals Reno and Banks, crossed Great Run and occupied the Sulphur Springs, under a heavy fire of artillery from batteries which the enemy had established all along the south side of the Rappahannock. The bridge <ar16_32> which had been built at Sulphur Springs, and upon which the forces of the enemy which had crossed a day or two previous escaped from the advance of General Sigel, was destroyed, and General Sigel pushed forward, with the force supporting him, in the direction of Waterloo Bridge. Mean time I had dispatched Brigadier-General Buford, with a heavy cavalry force from Warrenton, on the morning of the 24th, to reconnoiter the country in the vicinity of Waterloo Bridge, and to interrupt the passage of the river at that point as far as practicable. It was then believed by General Sigel, who so reported to me, that a considerable force of the enemy was on the north side of the Rappahannock, and was retiring from his advance in the direction of Waterloo Bridge. By noon of the 24th General Buford reported to me that he had occupied Waterloo Bridge without finding any force of the enemy, and he did not believe that there was any force between that place and Sulphur Springs. I directed him to destroy the bridge at Waterloo, and to maintain his position there until the arrival of the advance of General Sigel. I at once informed General Sigel of these facts, and directed him to push forward his advance to Waterloo. Milroy's brigade, constituting the advance of his corps, reached Waterloo late in the afternoon of the 24th. On that afternoon the whole force of the enemy was stretched along the line of the river from Rappahannock Station to Waterloo Bridge, with his center, and, I think, his main body, in the vicinity of Sulphur Springs.
During the day of the 24th a large detachment of the enemy, numbering thirty-six regiments of infantry, with the usual number of batteries of artillery and a considerable cavalry force, marched rapidly toward the north in the direction of Rectortown. They could be plainly seen from our signal stations established on high points along the Rappahannock, and their movements and force were reported to me from time to time by Col. J. S. Clark, of General Banks' staff, who, both on that day and for many preceding and succeeding days, had given me most valuable and reliable information. I am glad to express here my appreciation of the valuable services of this officer. On the night of the 24th my forces were distributed as follows: Ricketts' division, of McDowell's corps, on the road from Warrenton to Waterloo Bridge, and about 4 miles east of Waterloo; King's division, of the same corps, between Warrenton and the Sulphur Springs; Sigel's corps near the Rappahannock, with his advance at Waterloo Bridge and his rear in the direction of the Sulphur Sprigs; in his rear, and immediately in contact with him, was Banks' corps, while Reno's corps was east and very near the Sulphur Springs.
I was satisfied that no force of the enemy was on the north side of the Rappahannock, but I feared that during the next day--by which time the river would have fallen sufficiently to be passed at any of the fords--the enemy would make an attempt to cross at Rappahannock Station or at the fords between that point and Sulphur Springs; yet, as we were confronted at Waterloo Bridge and Sulphur Springs by the main body of the enemy, still moving toward our right, and as the heavy column mentioned previously was marching with all speed in the direction of White Plains and Salem, and from these points would be able to turn our right by the direction of Thoroughfare Gap or even north of that place, It was with the greatest reluctance, and only because I felt bound to do so under my instructions, that I took measures again to assure my communications with Fredericksburg. I append here with orders and dispatches sent and received during the 23d and 24th of August, which will of themselves furnish a succinct account of the <ar16_33> movements here set forth and all the information and assurances upon which these movements were made. On the 23d I received a dispatch from the General-in-Chief, informing me that heavy re-enforcements would begin to arrive at Warrenton Junction the succeeding day, and on the 24th I received dispatches from Colonel Haupt, the railroad superintendent at Alexandria, informing me that 30,000 men, ordered forward to join me, had demanded transportation from him, and that they would all be shipped that afternoon or early the next morning. The force which I thus expected, as reported to me, consisted of the division of General Sturgis, 10,000 strong; the division of General Cox, 7,000 strong; the corps of General Heintzelman, 10,000 strong, and the corps of General Franklin, 10,000 strong.
By the night of the 25th it became apparent to me that I could no longer keep open my communications with Fredericksburg and oppose the crossing of the Rappahannock at Rappahannock Station without abandoning the road from Warrenton to Washington and leaving open to the enemy the route through Thoroughfare Gap and all other roads north of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad; and as the main body of his forces was constantly tending in that direction I determined no longer to attempt to mask the lower fords of the Rappahannock, but to assemble such forces as I had along the Warrenton turnpike between Warrenton and Gainesville, and give battle to the enemy on my right or left, as he might choose. I therefore directed General McDowell to occupy Warrenton with his own and Sigel's corps, supporting him by Banks' corps from the direction of Fayetteville. I pushed Reno forward to occupy a point near the Warrenton turnpike and about 3 miles to the east of that town. I sent orders to General Porter, who had reported to me by note from the neighborhood of Bealeton Station, to push forward and Join Reno. Heintzelman's corps, which had reached Warrenton Junction, was ordered to remain for the present at that point, it being my purpose to push forward that corps as soon as practicable to Greenwich, about half way between Warrenton and Gainesville. I sent orders to Colonel Haupt to direct one of the strongest divisions being sent forward to take post in the works at Manassas Junction, and requested General Halleck to push Franklin with all speed to Gainesville; that he could march quite as rapidly as he could be transported by rail with the limited means of railroad transportation in our possession, and that his baggage and supplies could be sent forward to Gainesville by rail. I also sent orders to the colonel commanding at Manassas Junction for the first division that reached there from Alexandria to halt and take post in the works at that placed and directed him also to push forward all of his cavalry in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, to watch any movements the enemy might make from that direction. I had instructed General Sturgis, commanding at Alexandria, on the 22d of August, to post strong guards along the railroad from Manassas Junction to Catlett's Station, and requested him to superintend this in person. I also directed General Kearny, who reached Warrenton Junction on the 23d, to see that sufficient guards were placed all along the railroad in his rear. After these precautions and assurances I thought and confidently expected that by the afternoon of the 26th Franklin would have been at or near Gainesville, one division would have been occupying the works at Manassas Junction, and that the forces under Sturgis and Cox would have been at Warrenton Junction, whence they could have at once been pushed north in the direction of Warrenton turnpike. The orders for the disposition of the forces then under my <ar16_34> command were sent, and the movements made, so far as practicable, during the day of the 26th. About 8 o'clock at night on the 26th the advance of Jackson's force having passed through Thoroughfare Gap cut the railroad in the neighborhood of Kettle Run, about 6 miles east of Warrenton Junction. The cavalry force which I had sent forward toward Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 26th made no report to me.
The moment our communications were interrupted at Kettle Run I was satisfied that the troops which had been promised me from the direction of Washington had made no considerable progress. Had Franklin been even at Centreville on the 26th, or had Cox and Sturgis been as far west as Bull Run on that day, the movement of Jackson through Thoroughfare Gap upon the railroad at Manassas would have been utterly impracticable. So confidently did I expect, from the assurances which I had time and again received, that these troops would be in position, or at all events far advanced toward me, that Jackson's movement toward White Plains and in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap had caused but little uneasiness; but on the night of the 26th it was very apparent to me that all these expected re-enforcements had utterly failed me, and that upon the small force under my own immediate command I must depend alone for any present operations against the enemy. It was easy for me to retire in the direction of the lower fords of the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg, so as to bring me in immediate contact with the forces there or arriving there, but by so doing I should have left open the whole front of Washington; and after my own disappointment of the re-enforcements which I had expected I was not sure that there was any sufficient force, in the absence of the army under my command, to cover the capital. I determined therefore at once to abandon the line of the Rappahannock and throw my whole force in the direction of Gainesville and Manassas junction, to crush the enemy, who had passed through Thoroughfare Gap, and to interpose between the army of General Lee and Bull Run. During the night of the 26th the main body of the enemy still occupied their positions from Sulphur Springs to Waterloo Bridge and above, but toward morning on the 27th I think their advance moved off in the direction of White Plains, pursuing the route previously taken by Jackson, and no doubt with a view of uniting with him eastward the Bull Run Range.
From the 18th of August until the morning of the 27th the troops under my command had been continuously marching and fighting night and day, and during the whole of that time there was scarcely an interval of an hour without the roar of artillery. The men had had little sleep, were greatly worn down with fatigue, had had little time to get proper food or to eat it, had been engaged in constant battles and skirmishes, and had performed services laborious, dangerous, and excessive beyond any previous experience in this country. As was to be expected under such circumstances, the numbers of the army under my command had been greatly reduced by deaths, by wounds, by sickness, and by fatigue, so that on the morning of the 27th of August I estimated my whole effective force (and I think the estimate was large) as follows: Sigel's corps, 9,000 men; Banks' corps, 5,000 men; McDowell's corps, including Reynolds' division, 15,500 men; Reno's corps, 7,000 men; the corps of Heintzelman and Porter (the freshest by far in that army), about 18,000 men; making in all 54,500 men. Our cavalry numbered on paper about 4,000 men, but their horses were completely broken down and there were not 500 men, all told, capable of doing <ar16_35> much service, as should be expected from cavalry. The corps of Heintzelman had reached Warrenton Junction, but it was without wagons, without artillery, with only 40 rounds of ammunition to the man, and without even horses for the general and field officers. The corps of Porter had also reached Warrenton Junction with a very small supply of provisions and but 40 rounds of ammunition for each mall.
On the morning of the 27th, in accordance with the purpose previously set forth, I directed McDowell'to move forward rapidly on Gainesville, by the Warrenton turnpike, with his own corps and Sigel's and the division of Reynolds, so as to reach that point during the night. I directed General Reno, with his corps, followed by Kearny's division, of Heintzelman's corps, to move rapidly on Greenwich, so as to reach 1here that night, to communicate at once with General McDowell, and to support him in any operations against the enemy in the vicinity of Gainesville. I moved forward along the railroad toward Manassas Junction with Hooker's division, of Heintzelman's corps, leaving orders for General Porter to remain with his corps at Warrenton Junction until relieved by General Banks, who was marching to that place from Fayetteville, and, as soon as he was relieved, to push forward also in the direction of Gainesville, where at that time I expected the main collision with the enemy would occur.
The army trains of all the corps I instructed to take the road to Warrenton Junction and follow in the rear of Hooker's division toward Manassas Junction, so that the road pursued by the trains was entirely covered from any possible interruption by the enemy.
On the afternoon of the 27th a severe engagement occurred between Hooker's division and Ewell's division, of Jackson's forces. The action commenced about 4 miles west of Bristoe Station. Ewell was driven back along the railroad, but still confronted Hooker at dark along to the banks of Broad Run, immediately in front of Bristoe Station, at which point I arrived at sunset. The loss in this engagement was about 300 killed and wounded on each side. The enemy left his dead, many of his wounded, and much of his baggage on the field of battle.
The railroad had been torn up and the bridges burned in several places between Bristoe Station and Warrenton Junction. I accordingly directed Major-General Banks to cover the railroad trains at Warrenton Junction until General Porter's corps had marched from that place, and then to run back the trains as far as practicable, and, covering them with his troops, to repair the bridges as fast as possible. I also directed Captain Merrill, of the Engineers, with a considerable force, to repair the railroad track and bridges as far as possible in the direction of Bristoe Station. The road was accordingly put in order from Warrenton Junction to Kettle Run during the 27th, and the trains run back to that point early next day.
At dark on the 27th General Hooker reported to me that his ammunition was nearly exhausted, and that he had but about 5 rounds to the man left. I had by that time become conscious that the whole force under Jackson, consisting of his own, A. P. Hill's, and Ewell's divisions, was south of the Warrenton turnpike and in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas Junction. McDowell reached his position during the night of the 27th, as did also Kearny and Reno, and it was clear on that night that we had interposed completely between Jackson and the main body of the enemy, which was still west of the Bull Run range and in the neighborhood of White Plains. Thinking it altogether likely that Jackson would mass his whole force and attempt to turn our right at Bristoe Station, and knowing that Hooker, for <ar16_36> want of ammunition, was in little condition to make long resistance, I sent back orders to General Porter, about dark of the 27th, to move forward at 1 o'clock in the night and report to me at Bristoe by daylight in the morning, leaving instructions in some detail for Banks, who was expected at Warrenton Junction during that night or early in the morning. The orders for all these movements are herewith appended. General Porter failed utterly to obey the orders that were sent him, giving as an excuse that his men were tired, that they would straggle in the night, and that the wagon trains proceeding eastward, in the rear of Hooker's division, would offer obstructions to his march. He, however, made no attempt whatever to comply with this order, although it was stated to him in the order itself that his presence was necessary on all accounts at daylight, and that the officer delivering the dispatch was instructed to conduct him to the field.
There were but two courses left open to Jackson in consequence of this sudden and unexpected movement of the army: He could not retrace his steps through Gainesville, as it was occupied by McDowell, having at command a force equal, if not superior, to his own, and was either obliged, therefore, to retreat through Centreville, which would carry him still farther from the main body of Lee's army, or to mass his force, assault us at Bristoe Station, and turn our right. He pursued the former course, and retired through Centreville. This mistake of Jackson's alone saved us from the consequences which would have followed this flagrant and inexcusable disobedience of orders on the part of General Porter.
At 9 o'clock on the night of the 27th, satisfied of Jackson's position, I sent orders to General McDowell to push forward at the very earliest dawn of day toward Manassas Junction from Gainesville, resting his right on the Manassas Gap Railroad and throwing his left well to the east. I directed General Reno to march at the same hour from Greenwich direct upon Manassas Junction, and Kearny to march at the same hour upon Bristoe. This latter order was sent to Kearny to render my right at Bristoe perfectly secure against the probable movement of Jackson in that direction. Kearny arrived at Bristoe about 8 o'clock in the morning, Reno being on his left and marching direct upon Manassas Junction. I immediately pushed Kearny forward in pursuit of Ewell toward Manassas, followed by Hooker. General Porter's corps did not arrive at Bristoe until 10.30 o'clock in the morning, and the moment he found that Jackson had evacuated Manassas Junction he requested permission to halt at Bristoe and rest his men. Sykes' division, of Porter's corps, had spent the whole day of the 27th, from 10 o'clock in the morning until daylight of the 28th, in camp at Warrenton Junction. Morell's division, of the same corps, had arrived at Warrenton Junction during the day of the 27th, and also remained there during the whole of that night. Porter's corps was by far the freshest in the whole army, and should have been, and I believe was, in better condition for service than any troops we had. General McDowell reported to me afterward that he had given orders for the movement of his command upon Manassas Junction at 2 o'clock at night, in accordance with the directions I had sent him, but General Sigel, who commanded his advance and was at Gainesville, instead of moving for-word from Gainesville at daylight, as he was ordered, was absolutely with his advance in that town as late as 7.30 o'clock in the morning. Meantime, beginning about 3 o'clock in the morning of the 28th, Jackson commenced evacuating Manassas Junction, and his troops were marching from that point in the direction of Centreville until 10 or 11 <ar16_37> o'clock in the day. If the whole force under McDowell had moved forward as directed and at the time specified they would have intercepted Jackson's retreat toward Centreville by 8 o'clock in the morning, and I do not believe it would have been possible for Jackson to have crossed Bull Run, so closely engaged with our forces, without heavy loss.
I reached Manassas Junction with Kearny's division and Reno's corps about 12 o'clock in the day of the 28th, less than an hour after Jackson in person had retired. I immediately pushed forward Hooker, Kearny, and Reno upon Centreville, and sent orders to Fitz John Porter to come forward to Manassas Junction. I also wrote to McDowell, and stated the facts, so far as we were then able to ascertain them, and directed him to call back the whole of his force that had come in the direction of Manassas Junction and to move forward upon Centreville. He had, however, without my knowledge, detached Ricketts' division in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, and that division was no longer available in his movement toward Centreville. Late on the afternoon of the 28th Kearny drove the enemy's rear guard out of Centreville, and occupied that town, with his advance beyond it, about dark. The enemy retreated through Centreville, one portion of his force taking the road by Sudley Springs, and the other pursuing the Warrenton turnpike toward Gainesville? destroying the bridges on that road over Bull Run and Cub Run. McDowell, with his whole force, consisting of his own corps, except Ricketts' division, Sigel's corps, and the division of Reynolds, marching in the direction of Centreville, encountered the advance of Jackson's force retreating toward Thoroughfare Gap about 6 o'clock on the evening of the 28th. A severe action took place between King's division, of McDowell's corps, and the advance of Jackson, which was terminated by darkness. Each party maintained its ground. Gibbon's brigade, of King's division, which was in the advance of that division, sustained the brunt of the action, but was supported handsomely by Doubleday's brigade, which came into action shortly after. This engagement and its result were reported to me near Centreville about 10 o'clock that night.
I felt sure then, and so stated, that there was no escape for Jackson. I accordingly sent orders to General McDowell,  as also to General King, several times during the night of the 28th, and once by his own staff ofiicer, to hold his ground at all hazards to prevent the retreat of Jackson to the west: and that at daylight in the morning our whole force from Centreville and Manassas Junction would be up with the enemy, who must be crushed between us. I also sent orders to General Kearny to push forward at 1 o'clock that night cautiously from Centreville along the Warrenton turnpike; to drive in the pickets of the enemy, and to keep closely in contact with him during the night; to rest his left on the Warrenton turnpike and throw his right well to the north, if possible across Little River turnpike; at daylight in the morning to assault vigorously with his right advanced, and that Hooker and Reno would be up with him very shortly after daylight. I sent orders to General Porter, whom I supposed to be at Manassas Junction, where he should have been in compliance with my orders of the day previous, to move upon Centreville at the earliest dawn, and stated to him the position of the forces, and that a severe battle would undoubtedly be fought during the morning of the 29th. The only apprehension I had at that time was that Jackson might attempt to retreat to the north in the direction of Leesburg, and, for the purpose of preventing this, I directed Kearny to keep closely in contact with him during <ar16_38> the whole of the night of the 28th. My forces were so disposed that McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds, whose joint forces amounted to about 25,000 men, were immediately west of Jackson and between him and Thoroughfare Gap, whilst Kearny, Hooker, Reno, and Porter, about 25,000 strong, were to fall on him from the east at daylight in the morning or very shortly after. With this disposition of troops we were so far in advance of Longstreet that, by using our whole force vigorously, we should be able to crush Jackson before Longstreet could by any possibility reach the scene of action. To my great disappointment, however, I learned toward daylight on the morning of the 29th that King's division had fallen back in the direction of Manassas Junction, thus leaving open the road to Thoroughfare Gap, and making new movements and dispositions of troops immediately necessary.
I submit herewith the reports of Generals King, Gibbon, and Doubleday of the action of the evening of the 28th, as also a detailed report of General McDowell. The orders directing all these movements are also appended, and they bring the operations of the army up to the 29th of August. The losses in King's division in the action of the evening of the 28th were principally in Gibbon's brigade of that division, and numbered ------ . Gibbon's brigade consisted of some of the best troops in the service, and the conduct of both men and officers was gallant and distinguished. The report of General King,(*) herewith appended, exhibits his high opinion of the conduct of this brigade, and of the officers who distinguished themselves in that action.
The disposition of troops on the west of Jackson having failed through Ricketts' movement toward Thoroughfare Gap and the con sequent withdrawal of King, an immediate change in the disposition and proposed movements of the troops for the succeeding day became necessary, and about daylight on the morning of the 29th, shortly after I received information of the withdrawal of King's division, I sent orders to General Sigel, who was in the neighborhood of Groveton, supported by Reynolds' division, to attack the enemy vigorously as soon as it was light enough see, and bring him to a stand if it were possible to do so. I instructed General Heintzelman to push forward from Centreville toward Gainesville at the earliest dawn with the divisions of Hooker and Kearny, and directed General Reno to follow closely in his rear; to use all speed, and as soon as he came up with the enemy to establish communication with Sigel, and attack with the utmost promptness and vigor. I also sent orders to Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, at Manassas Junction, to move forward with the utmost rapidity with his own corps and King's division, of McDowell's corps, which was supposed to be at that point, upon Gainesville, by the direct road from Manassas Junction to that place. I urged him to make all speed, that he might come up with the enemy, and be able to turn his flank near where the Warrenton turnpike is intersected by the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville. Shortly after sending this order I received a note from General McDowell, whom I had not been able to find during the night of the 28th, dated at Manassas Junction, requesting that Kings division might not be taken from his command. I immediately sent a joint order to Generals McDowell and Porter, directing them, with their two corps, to march with all speed toward Gainesville on the direct road from Manassas Junction. This order, which is appended, sets forth in detail the movements they were directed to make. <ar16_39>
Sigel attacked the enemy about daylight on the morning of the 29th, a mile or two east of Groveton, where he was soon joined by the divisions of Hooker and Kearny. Jackson fell back several miles, but was so closely pressed by these forces that he was compelled to make a stand and to make the best defense possible. He accordingly took up a position with his left in the neighborhood of Sudley Springs, his right a little to the south of Warrenton turnpike, and his line covered by an old railroad grade which leads from Gainesville in the direction of Leesburg. His batteries, which were numerous, and some of them of heavy caliber, were posted behind the ridges in the open ground on both sides of Warrenton turnpike, whilst the mass of his troops was sheltered in dense woods behind the railroad embankment.
I arrived on the field from Centreville about noon, and found the two armies confronting each other, both considerably cut up by the sharp action in which they had been engaged since daylight in the morning. Heintzelman's corps occupied the right of our line, in front or west of the Sudley Springs road. General Sigel was on his left, with his line extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike, the division of General Schenck occupying the high ground to the left of that road. The extreme left was occupied by the division of General Reynolds. General Reno's corps had reached the field, and most of it had been pushed forward into action, leaving four regiments in reserve and in rear of the center of our line. Immediately after I reached the ground General Sigel reported to me that his line was weak; that the divisions of Schurz and Steinwehr were much cut up, and ought to be drawn back from the front. I informed General Sigel that this was utterly impossible, as there were no troops to replace them, and that he must hold his ground; that I would not again push his troops into action, as the corps of Porter and McDowell were moving forward from Manassas Junction on the road to Gainesville and must very soon be in position to fall upon the enemy's right flank and probably upon his rear. I rode to the front of our line and inspected it from right to left, giving the same information to Generals Heintzelman and Reno. The troops were accordingly suffered to rest in their positions and to resupply themselves with ammunition. From 12 o'clock until 4 very severe skirmishes occurred constantly at various points on our line, and were brought on at every indication that the enemy made of a disposition to retreat.
About 2 o'clock in the afternoon several pieces of artillery were discharged on the extreme right of the enemy's line, and I fully believed that Generals Porter and McDowell had reached their positions and had become engaged with the enemy. I did not hear more than three shots fired, and was at a loss to know what had become of these two corps or what was delaying them; but I received information shortly afterward that General McDowell was advancing to join the main body by the Sudley Springs road, and would probably be up with us in two hours. At 4.30 o'clock I sent a peremptory order to General Porter to push forward at once into action on the enemy's right, and, if possible, to turn his rear, stating to him generally the condition of things on the field in front of me. About 5.30 o'clock, when General Porter should have been coming into action in compliance with this order, I directed Generals Heintzelman and Reno to assault the left of the enemy. The attack was made with great gallantry, and the whole of the left of the enemy was doubled back toward his center, and our forces, after a sharp conflict of an hour and a half, occupied the field of battle, with the dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands. In this <ar16_40> attack Grover's brigade, of Hooker's division, was particularly distinguished by a determined bayonet charge, breaking two of the enemy's lines and penetrating to the third before it could be checked. By this time General McDowell had arrived on the field, and I pushed his corps immediately to the front along the Warrenton turnpike, with orders to fall upon the enemy, who was retreating toward the pike from the direction of Sudley Springs.
The attack along the turnpike was made by King's division at about sunset in the evening, but by that time the advance of the main body of the enemy, under Longstreet, had begun to reach the field, and King's division encountered a stubborn and determined resistance at a point about three-fourths of a mile in front of our line of battle.
Whilst this attack was going on the forces under Heintzelman and Reno continued to push back the left of the enemy in the direction of the Warrenton turnpike, so that about 8 o'clock in the evening the greater portion of the field of battle was occupied by our army. Nothing was heard of General Porter up to that time and his forces took no part whatever in the action, but were suffered by him to lie idle on their arms, within sight and sound of the battle, during the whole day. So far as I know, he made no effort whatever to comply with my orders or to take any part in the action. I do not hesitate to say that if he had discharged his duty as became a soldier under the circumstances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the larger portion of Jackson's force before he could have been by any possibility sufficiently re-enforced to have made any effective resistance. I did not myself feel for a moment that it was necessary for me, having given General Porter an order to march toward the enemy in a particular direction, to send him in addition specific orders to attack, it being his clear duty, and in accordance with every military precept, to have brought his forces into action wherever he encountered the enemy when a furious battle with that enemy was raging during the whole day in his immediate presence. I believe--in fact, I am positive-that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th General Porter had in his front no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson and to have fallen upon his rear; that if he had done so we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet; and that the army of General Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character. I speak thus freely of the strange failure of General Porter, not because I am more convinced of its unfortunate results now than I was at the time, but because a full investigation of the whole subject, made by a court-martial, has fully justified and confirmed that opinion.
Our losses during the 29th were very heavy, but no separate return of killed and wounded for that day have been made tome. I believed, from all I could learn from corps commanders, and so reported, that our loss during that day was not less than 6,000 or 8,000 killed and wounded, and  I think this estimate will be confirmed by the general reports which cover the losses during the battles of the 27th,28th, 29th, and 30th August and the 1st of September. My estimate of the loss of the enemy, reported to the Department on the morning of the 30th, was based upon the statements made to me by Generals Hooker and Kearny, who had <ar16_41> been over the whole field on the left. General Hooker estimated the loss of the enemy as at least two to one,  and General Kearny as at least three to one, of our own.
Every indication during the night of the 29th and up to 10 o'clock on the morning of the 30th pointed to the retreat of the enemy from our front. Paroled prisoners of our own, taken on the evening of the 29th, and who came into our lines on the morning of the 30th, reported the enemy retreating during the whole night in the direction of and along the Warrenton turnpike. Generals McDowell and Heintzelman, who reconnoitered the positions held by the enemy's left on the evening of the 29th, confirmed this statement. They reported to me that the positions occupied by the enemy's left had been evacuated, and that there was every indication that he was retreating in the direction of Gainesville.
On the morning of the 30th, as may be supposed, our troops, who had been so continually marching and fighting for so many days, were in a state of great exhaustion. They had had little to eat for two days previous, and the artillery and cavalry horses had been in harness and saddled continually for ten days, and had had no forage for two days previous. It may easily be imagined how little these troops, after such severe labor, and after undergoing such hardship and privation, were in condition for active and efficient service. I had telegraphed to the General-in-Chief on the 28th our condition, and had begged of him to have rations and forage sent forward to us from Alexandria with all dispatch. I also called his attention to the imminent need of cavalry horses to enable the cavalry belonging to the army to perform any service whatever.
About daylight of the 30th I received a note from General Franklin, herewith appended, writ ten by direction of General McClellan, and dated at 8 o'clock the evening before, informing me that rations and forage would be loaded into the available wagons and cars at Alexandria as soon as I would send back a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. Such a letter, when we were fighting the enemy and Alexandria was swarming with troops, needs no comment. Bad as was the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation to spare troops from the front, nor could they have gone to Alexandria and returned within the time by which we must have had provisions or have fallen back in the direction of Washington, nor do I yet see what service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad trains.
It was not until I received this letter that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations with which I was charged, but I felt it to be my duty, notwithstanding the desperate condition of my command, from great fatigue, from want of provisions and forage, and from the small hope that I had of any effective assistance from Alexandria, to hold my position at all hazards and under all privations unless overwhelmed by the superior forces of the enemy. I had received no sort of information of any troops coming forward to my assistance since the 24th, and did not expect on the morning of the 30th that any assistance would reach me from the direction of Washington, but I determined again to give battle to the enemy on the 30th, and at least to lay on such blows as would cripple him as much as possible and delay as long as practicable any farther advance toward the capital. I accordingly prepared to renew the engagement. At that time my effective forces greatly reduced by losses in killed, wounded, missing, and broken-down men during the severe, privations of two or three days and nights previous, the sharp <ar16_42> actions of Hooker, King, and Ricketts on the 27th and 28th, and the furious battle on the 29th--were estimated by me and others as follows: McDowell's corps, including Reynolds' division, 12,000 men; Sigel's corps, 7,000 men; Reno's corps. 7,000; Heintzelman's corps, 7,000 men; Porter's corps, which had been in no engagement, and was, or ought to have been, perfectly fresh, I estimated at about 12,000 men, including the brigade of Piatt, which formed a part of Sturgis' division, and the only portion that ever joined me; but of this force the brigades of Piatt and of Griffin, numbering, as I understood, about 5,000 men, had been suffered to march off at daylight on the 30th to Centreville, and were not available for operations on that day. This reduced Porter's effective force on the field to about 7,000 men, which gave me a total force of 40,000 men. Banks' corps, about 5,000 strong, was at Bristoe Station, in charge of the railroad trains and of a portion of the wagon trains of the army still at that place.
Between 12 and 2 o'clock in the day I advanced the corps of Porter, supported by King's division, of McDowell’s corps, to attack the enemy along the Warrenton turnpike. At the same time I directed Heintzel-man and Reno, on our right, to push forward to the left and front toward Warrenton turnpike and attack the enemy's left in flank, if possible. For a short time Ricketts' division, of McDowell's corps, was placed in support of this movement on our right. It was necessary for me to act thus promptly and make an attack, as I had not the time, for want of provisions and forage, to await an attack from the enemy, nor did I think it good policy to do so under the circumstances. During the whole night of the 29th and the morning of the 30th the advance of the main army under Lee was arriving on the field to reenforce Jackson, so that by 12 or 1 o'clock in the day we were confronted by forces greatly superior to our own, and these forces were being every moment largely increased by fresh arrivals of the enemy from the direction of Thorough fare Gap. Every moment of delay increased the odds against us, and I therefore advanced to the attack as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into action. Shortly after General Porter moved forward to the attack along the Warrenton turnpike and the assault on the enemy was made by Heintzelman and Reno on the right it became apparent that the enemy was missing his troops as fast as they arrived on the field on his right and was moving forward from that direction to turn our left, at which point it was plain he intended to make his main attack. I accordingly directed General McDowell to recall Ricketts' division immediately from our right and post it on the left of our line with its left refused. The attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon retired in considerable confusion. As soon as they commenced to fall back the enemy advanced to the assault, and our whole line from right to left; was soon, on furiously engaged. The main attack of the enemy was refute upon our left, but was met with stubborn resistance by the divisions of General Schenck, General Milroy, and General Reynolds, who, shortly after the action began, were re-enforced  on their left and rear by the division of Ricketts. The action raged furiously for several hours, the enemy bringing up his heavy reserves and pouring mass after mass of his troops upon our left. So greatly superior in number were his forces that, whilst overpowering us on our left, he was able to assault us also with very superior forces on our right. Porter's forces were rallied and brought to a halt as they were retiring to the rear. As soon as  they could be used, I pushed them forward to support our left, and they there rendered most distinguished service, especially the brigade of regulars under Colonel Buchanan. <ar16_43>
Tower's brigade, of Ricketts' division, was pushed forward into action in support of Reynolds' division, and was led forward in person by General Tower with conspicuous skill and gallantry.. The conduct of that brigade, in plain view of all the forces on our left, was especially distinguished, and drew forth hearty and enthusiastic cheers. The example of this brigade was of great service, and infused new spirit into all the troops who witnessed their intrepid conduct. Reno's corps was also withdrawn from its position on our right center late in the afternoon and thrown into the action on our left, where it behaved with conspicuous gallantry. Notwithstanding these great disadvantages our troops held their ground with the utmost firmness and obstinacy, and the losses on both sides were very heavy. By dark our left had been forced back about half or three-quarters of a mile, but still remained firm and unbroken and still covered the turnpike in our rear.
About 6 o'clock in the afternoon, I heard accidentally that Franklin's corps had arrived at a point about 4 miles east of Centreville and 12 miles in our rear, and that it was only about 8,000 strong. The result of the battle of the 30th, the very heavy losses we had suffered, and the complete prostration of our troops from hunger and fatigue made it plain to me that we were no longer able, in the face of such overwhelming odds, to maintain our position so far to the front, nor would we have been able to do so under any circumstances, suffering as were the men and horses from fatigue and hunger and weakened by the heavy losses incident to the uncommon hardships which they had suffered.
About 8 o'clock at night, therefore, I sent written instructions to the commanders of corps to withdraw leisurely toward Centreville, and stated to them what route each should pursue and where they should take post. General Reno was instructed with his whole corps to cover the movements of the army toward Centreville. The withdrawal was made slowly, quietly, and in good order, no pursuit whatever having been attempted by the enemy. A division of infantry, with its batteries, was posted to cover the crossing of Cub Run.
The exact losses in this battle I am unable to give, as the reports received from the corps commanders only exhibit the aggregate losses during the whole of the operations from the 22d of August to the 2d of September. Before leaving the field that night I sent orders to General Banks, at Bristoe Station, to destroy the railroad trains and such of the stores in them as he was unable to carry off, and rejoin me at Centreville. I had previously sent him orders to throw into each wagon of the army trains as much as possible of the stores from the railroad cars, and to be sure and bring off with him from Warrenton Junction and Bristoe all the ammunition and all the sick and wounded that could be transported, and for this purpose, if it were necessary, to throw out the personal baggage, tents, &c., from the regimental trains. These several orders are appended. At no time during the 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st of August was the road between Bristoe Station and Centreville interrupted by the enemy. The whole of the trains of the army were on that road in charge of General Banks, and covered and protected by his whole corps. If any of these wagons were lost, as I believe none were, it was wholly without necessity. I enter thus specifically into this matter, and submit the orders sent to General Banks and his subsequent report to me, because no part of the misrepresentation of this campaign has been grosser than the statement of our heavy loss of wagons and supplies. The orders submitted will show conclusively that every arrangement was made, in the utmost detail, for the <ar16_44> security of our trains and supplies, and I am quite convinced that General Banks is not the man to neglect the duty with which he was charged.
I arrived at Centreville between 9 and 10 o'clock on the night of the 30th. The same night I sent orders to the corps commanders to report to me in person as early after daylight as possible on the morning of the 31st, and on that morning the troops were directed to be posted as follows: Porter to occupy the intrenchments on the north or right of Centreville; Franklin on his left,, in the intrenchments. In rear of Centreville, between Franklin and Porter, as a support, was posted the corps of Heintzelman. Sigel occupied the intrenchments on the left and south side of the town, with Reno on his left and rear. Banks was ordered to take post, as soon as he arrived, on the north side of Bull Run, and to cover the bridge on the road from Centreville to Manassas Junction. Sumner, as soon as he arrived, was ordered to take post between Centreville and Chantilly, and to occupy Chant illy in force. McDowell was posted about 2 miles in the rear of Centerville, on the road to Fairfax Court-House. Ammunition trains and some provisions were gotten up on the 31st, and all corps commanders were notified, by special order to each, that the ammunition trains were parked immediately in rear of Centreville, and were directed to send officers to procure such ammunition as was needed in their respective corps. I directed the whole of the trains of the army to be unloaded at Centreville and sent to Fairfax Station to bring up forage and rations.
We remained during the whole day of the 31st resting the men, getting up supplies of provisions, and resupplying the command with ammunition.
The enemy's cavalry appeared in force in front of our advance at Cub Run during the morning of the 31st, but made no attempt to cross and no attack upon our troops posted there. A few pieces of artillery were fired, but with no result on either side. The whole force that I had at Centreville, as reported to me by the corps commanders on the morning of the 1st of September, after receiving the corps of Sumner and Franklin, was as follows: McDowell's corps, 10,000 men; Sigel's corps, about 7,000 men; Heintzelman's corps, about 6,000; Reno's, 6,000; Banks', 5,000; Porter's, about 9,000; Franklin's. 8,000; Sumner's, 11,000--in all, 62,000 men. From these forces two brigades, as I before stated, had been sent to Fairfax Station to guard the trains and the depot at that place, which makes it necessary to deduct 4,000 men. It is proper for me to state here, and I do it with regret and reluctance, that at least one-half of this great diminution of our forces was occasioned by skulking and straggling from the army. The troops which were brought into action fought with all gallantry and determination, but thousands of men straggled away from their commands and were not in any action. I had posted several regiments in rear of the field of battle on the 29th of August, and although many thousand stragglers and skulkers were arrested by them, many others passed around through the woods, and did not rejoin their commands during the remainder of the campaign. I had telegraphed to the General-in-Chief, from Rappahannock Station, on the 22d, that this practice of straggling was very common, and was reducing our force considerably, even at that time. I also sent orders on the same day to General Sturgis to arrest all stragglers arriving at Alexandria, to confine them in military prisons, and to bring them to speedy trial The active and incessant movements of the army prevented me, during the whole of this campaign, <ar16_45>  from giving that attention to the subject which ought to be and must be given to it, to preserve efficiency and discipline among any troops. Our cavalry at Ccntreville was completely broken down, no horses whatever having reached us to remount it. Generals Buford and Bayard, commanding the whole of the cavalry force of the army, reported to me that there were not 5 horses to the company that could be forced into a trot. It was impossible, therefore, to cover our front with cavalry or to make cavalry reconnaissances, as is usual and necessary in front of an army. I directed General Sumner, on the morning of the 1st of September, to push forward a reconnaissance of two brigades toward the Little River turnpike, to ascertain if the enemy were making any movements in the direction of Germantown or Fairfax Court-House. The enemy was found moving again slowly toward our right, heavy columns of his force being in march toward Fairfax along Little River turnpike.
The main body of our forces was so much broken down and so completely exhausted that they were in no condition, even on the 1st of September, for any active operations against the enemy, but I determined to attack at daylight on the 2d of September in front of Chantilly. The movement of the enemy had become so developed by the afternoon of the 1st, and was so evidently directed to Fairfax CourtHouse, with a view of turning my right, that I made the necessary disposition of my troops to fight a battle between the Little River pike and the road from Centreville to Fairfax Court-House. I sent General Hooker early in the afternoon to Fairfax Court-House, and directed him to assemble all the troops that were in the vicinity and to push forward to Germantown with his advance.
I directed McDowell to move back along the road to Fairfax CourtHouse as far as Difficult Creek, and to connect by his right with Hooker. Reno was to push forward to the north of the road from Centreville to Fairfax in the direction of Chantlily. Heintzelman's corps was directed to take post on the road between Centreville and Fairfax, immediately in the rear of Reno. Franklin took post on McDowell's left and rear. Sumner was posted on the left of Heintzelman, whilst the corps of Sigel and Porter were directed to unite with the right of Sumner. Banks was instructed, with the wagon trains of the army, to pursue the Old Braddock road and come into the Alexandria turnpike In rear of Fairfax Court-House. Just before sunset on the 1st the enemy attacked us on our right, but was met by Hooker, McDowell, Reno, and Kearny's divisions, of Heintzelman's corps. A very severe action occurred in the midst of a terrific thunder-storm, and was terminated shortly after dark. The enemy was driven back entirely from our front, but during that engagement we lost two of the best and one of the most distinguished of our general officers--Major-General Kearny and Brigadier-General Stevens--who were both killed while gallantly leading their commands and in front of their line of battle. It is unnecessary for me to say one word of commendation of two officers who were so well and widely known to the country. Words cannot express my sense of the zeal, the gallantry, and the sympathy of that most earnest and accomplished soldier Major-General Kearny. In him the country has suffered a loss which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to repair. He died as he would wish to die, and as became his heroic character.
On the morning of the 2d of September, the enemy still continuing his movement toward our right, my whole force was posted behind Difficult Creek, from Flint Hill to the Alexandria turnpike. Although <ar16_46> we were quite able to maintain our position at that place until the stragglers could be collected and the army, after its labors and perils, put into condition for effective service, I considered it advisable, for reasons which developed themselves at Centreville, and which I explained to the General-in-Chief and set forth herewith in the appendix, that the troops should be drawn back to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and that some reorganization should be made of them, in order that earlier effective service should be secured than was possible in their condition at that time. I received orders about 12 o'clock on the 2d of September to draw back the forces within the intrenchments, which was done in good order and without any interruption by the enemy.
The reasons which induced me, before I took the field in Virginia, to express to the Government my desire to be relieved from the command of the Army of Virginia and to return to the West, existed in equal if not greater force at this time than when I first stated them. I accordingly renewed urgently my application to be relieved. The Government assented to it with some reluctance, and I was transferred to the command of the Department of the Northwest, for which department I left Washington on the 7th of September.
It seems proper for me, since so much misrepresentation has been put into circulation as to the support I received from the Army of the Potomac, to state here precisely what forces of that army came under my command and were at any time engaged in the active operations of the campaign. Reynolds' division of Pennsylvania Reserves, about 2,500 strong, joined me on the 23d of August at Rappahannock Station. The corps of Heintzelman and Porter, about 18,000 strong, joined me on the 26til and 27th of August at Warrenton Junction.
the Pennsylvania Reserves, under Reynolds, and Heintzelman's corps, consisting of the divisions (of Hooker and Kearny, rendered most gallant and efficient service in all the operations which occurred after they had reported to me. Porter's corps, from unnecessary and unusual delays and frequent and flagrant disregard of my orders, took no part whatever except in the action of the 30th of August. This small fraction of 20,500 men was all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's Landing which ever drew trigger under my command or in any way took part in that campaign. By the time that the corps of Franklin and Sumner, 19,000 strong, joined me at Centreville, the original Army of Virginia, as well as the corps of Heintzelman and the division of Reynolds, had been so much cut up in the severe actions in which they had been engaged and were so much broken down and diminished in numbers by the constant and excessive duties they had performed, that they were in little condition for any effective service whatever, and required and should have had some days of rest to put them in anything like condition to perform their duties in the field.
Such is the history of a campaign, substantiated by documents written during the operations and herewith appended, which has been misunderstood to an extent perhaps unparalleled in the history of warfare. I submit it here to the public judgment, with all confidence that it will be fairly and deliberately considered, and a just verdict pronounced upon it and upon the army engaged in it. Upon such unbiased judgment I am very willing, setting aside any previous record I have made during this war, to rest my reputation as a soldier. I shall submit cheerfully to the verdict of my countrymen, but I desire that that verdict shall be rendered upon a full knowledge of the facts.
I well understood, as does every military man, how difficult and how <ar16_47> thankless was the duty devolved upon me, and I am not ashamed to say that I would gladly have avoided it if I could have done so consistently with my sense of duty to the Government. To confront with a small army vastly superior forces, to fight battles without hope of victory, but only to gain time and to embarrass and delay the forward movements of the enemy, is of all duties the most hazardous and the most difficult which call be imposed upon any general or any army. While such operations require the highest courage and endurance on the part of the troops, they are perhaps unlikely to be understood or appreciated, and the results, however successful, have little in them to attract popular attention and applause.
At no time could I have hoped to fight a successful battle with the immensely superior force of the enemy which confronted me, and which was able at any time to outflank me and bear my small army to the dust. It was only by constant movement, by incessant watchfulness, and by hazardous skirmishes and battles that the forces under my command were not overwhelmed, whilst at the same time the enemy was embarrassed and delayed in his advance upon Washington until the forces from the Peninsula were at length assembled for the defense of that city. I did hope that in the course of these operations the enemy might commit some imprudence or leave some opening of which I could take such advantage as to gain at least a partial victory over his forces. This opportunity was presented by the advance of Jackson upon Manassas Junction; but, although the best dispositions possible under the circumstances were ordered, the object was frustrated in a manner and by causes which are now well understood. I am gratified to know that the conduct of that campaign, every detail of which was communicated day by day to the General-in-Chief, was fully approved by him and by the government., and I now gladly submit the subject to the judgment of the country.
General Banks rendered most efficient and faithful service throughout the campaign, and his conduct at the battle of Cedar Mountain and during the operations on the Upper Rappahannock was marked by great coolness, intrepidity, and zeal. General McDowell led his corps during the whole of the campaign with eminent ability and vigor, and I am greatly indebted to him for zealous and distinguished service both in the battles of the 29th and 30th of August and in the operations which preceded and succeeded those battles. General Sigel rendered useful service in reorganizing and putting in condition the First Army Corps of the Army of Virginia, and made many valuable and highly important reconnaissances during the operations of the campaign. I cannot express myself too highly of the zealous, gallant, and cheerful manner in which General Reno deported himself from the beginning to the end of the operations. Ever prompt, earnest, and soldierly, he was the model of all accomplished soldier and a gallant gentleman, and his loss has been a heavy blow to the army and to the country. General Heintzelman performed his duty faithfully and honestly, whilst the commanders of the divisions of his corps (Generals Kearny and Hooker) have that place in the public estimation which they have earned by many gallant and heroic actions, and which renders it unnecessary for me to do aught except pay this tribute to the memory of one and to the rising fame of the other. Generals Williams, Augur, Crawford, Greene, Geary; Carroll, and Prince, of Banks' corps, have been already noticed for their gallant and distinguished conduct at Cedar Mountain. Generals King and Ricketts, of McDowell's corps, led their divisions throughout the operations with skill and efficiency, <ar16_48> and General King, before he marched from Fredericksburg, rendered important service in organizing and dispatching the expeditions which on several occasions broke up the line of the Virginia Central Railroad. Generals Patrick, Doubleday, Gibbon, Hartsuff, Duryea, and Tower commanded their brigades in the various operations of this campaign with ability and zeal. The latter-named officer especially was particularly distinguished by the long marches which he made, by his incessant activity, and by the distinguished gallantry he displayed in the action of the 30th of August, in which action he was severely wounded at the head of his brigade. General Hatch, after being relieved front the command of the cavalry of Banks' corps, was assigned to the command of one infantry brigade in King's division, of McDowell's corps: and during part of the operations was in command of that division and rendered good service. Generals Schenck and Milroy, of Sigel's corps, exhibited great gallantry and zeal throughout the operations. They were engaged actively in the battles of the 29th and 30th of August, and their commands were among the last to leave the field of battle on the night of the 30th, General Schenck being severely wounded on that day. I must also mention in high terms the conduct of Generals Schurz, Stahel, and Steinwehr during the action of the 29th and 30th. Generals Birney, Robinson, and Grover, of Heintzelman's corps, commanded their brigades during the action of the 29th and 30th, and Birney during the action of the 1st September, with zeal and gallantry, and Generals Birney and Grover were especially distinguished in the actions of the 29th and 30th of August, and Birney also in the engagement on the 1st of September. General Stevens, of Reno's corps, was zealous and active throughout the operations, and distinguished himself in the most auspicious manner during the battles of the 29th and 30th of August. He was killed at the head of his command in the battle near Chantilly on the 1st of September, and his death will be deeply felt by the army and the country. Lieut. Col. R. C. Buchanan, commanding a brigade of regulars of Porter's corps, was noticeable for distinguished service on the afternoon of the 30th of August.
Of the conduct of the officers commanding divisions and brigades of Porter's corps I know nothing, having received no report from that officer of the operations of his corps. Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds, commanding the Pennsylvania Reserves, merits the highest commendation at my hands. Prompt, active, and energetic, he commanded his division with distinguished ability throughout the operations, and performed his duties in all situations with zeal and fidelity. Generals Seymour and Meade, of that division, in like manner performed their duties with ability and gallantry and in all fidelity to the Government and to the army.
General Sturgis arrived at Warrenton Junction on the 26th of August with Piatt's brigade, of his division, the only portion of that division which ever joined me. This brigade was temporarily attached to the army corps of Fitz John Porter, and, although misled in consequence of orders to follow Griffin's brigade, of Porter's corps, which, for some unexplained reason, strayed from its corps to Centreville on the 30th of August, was led forward from that place by Generals Sturgis and Piatt as soon as it was discovered that Griffin did not intend to go forward to the field of battle, and reported to me late in the afternoon of that day. Shortly afterward the brigade was thrown forward into action on our left, where they acquitted themselves with great courage. Brigadier-General Sturgis, as well as General Piatt, deserve especial mention for the soldierly feeling which induced them, after <ar16_49> being thus misled and with the bad example of Griffin before their eyes, to push forward with such zeal and alacrity to the field of battle and the valuable service which they rendered in the action of the 30th of August. Generals Bayard and Buford commanded the cavalry belonging to the Army of Virginia. Their duties were peculiarly arduous and hazardous, and it is not too much to say that throughout the operations, from the first to the last day of the campaign, scarcely a day passed that these officers did not render service which entitles them to the gratitude of the Government. The detachments of the Signal Corps with the various army corps rendered most important service, and I cannot speak too highly of the value of that corps and of the important information which from time to time they communicated to me. They were many times in positions of extreme peril, but were always prompt and ready to encounter any danger in the discharge of their duties.
Brig. Gen. Julius White, with one brigade, was in the beginning of the campaign placed in command at Winchester. He was selected for that position because I felt entire confidence in his courage and ability, and during the whole of his service there he performed his duty with the utmost efficiency, and relieved me entirely from any apprehension concerning that region of country. He was withdrawn from his position by orders direct from Washington, and passed from under my command.
I transmit herewith reports of corps, division, and brigade commanders, which will be found to embrace all the details of their respective operations, and which do justice to the officers and soldiers under their command.
To my personal staff I owe much gratitude and many thanks. Their duties were particularly arduous, and at times led them into the midst of the various actions in which we were engaged. It is saying little when I state that they were zealous, untiring, and efficient throughout the campaign. To Brigadier-General Roberts in particular I am indebted for services marked throughout by skill, courage, and unerring judgment, and worthy of the solid reputation as a soldier he has acquired by many years of previous faithful and distinguished military service. I desire also specially to mention Brigadier-General Elliott, Surgeon McParlin, Colonel Beckwith, Lieut. Col. T. C. H. Smith, Captain Piper, chief of artillery, Captain Merrill, of the Engineers, and Lieutenant Shunk, chief of ordnance. I must also honorably mention the following members of my staff, the conduct of all of whom met my hearty approval and merits high commendation: Colonels Macomb, Clary, Marshall, Butler, Morgan, and Welch, Majors Selfridge and Melinc, Captains Asch, Douglass Pope, Haight, Atchison, De Kay, Piatt, Paine, and Strother. Mr. McCain, confidential telegraph operator at my headquarters, accompanied me throughout the campaign, and was at all times eminently useful and efficient. My personal escort, consisting of two small companies of the First Ohio Cavalry, numbering about 100 men, performed the most arduous service probably of any troops in the campaign. As orderlies, messengers, and guards they passed many sleepless nights and weary days. Their conduct in all the operations, as in every battle, was marked by uncommon activity and gallantry.
The reports of corps, division, and brigade commanders, herewith submitted, exhibit the loss in killed, wounded, and missing in their <ar16_50> respective commands. No report of any descriptions has been received from the army corps of Banks and Reno.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 JNO. POPE,
 Major-General, U. S· Volunteers.
 Brig· Gen. G. W. CULLUM,
Chief of Staff and of Eng'rs, Hdqrs· of Army, Washington, D.C.