OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, WEST VIRGINIA, AND MARYLAND.
March 17-September 2, 1862.
No. 1.--Extract from report of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, U. S. Army, General-in-Chief, of operations July 23--September 12.
HDQRS. OF THE ARMY, Washington, Nov. 25, 1862.
SIR: In compliance with your orders I have the honor to submit the following report of military operations since the 23d of July last, when, <ar16_5> in compliance with the President's order of July 11, I assumed the command of the Army as General-in-Chief.
The first thing to which my attention was called on my arrival here was the condition of the army at Harrison's Landing, on the James River. I immediately visited General McClellan's headquarters for consultation. I left Washington on the 24th and returned on the 27th. The main object of this consultation was to ascertain if there was a possibility of all advance upon Richmond from Harrison's Landing, and, if not, to form some plan of uniting the armies of General McClellan and General Pope on some other line. Not being familiar with the position and numbers of the troops in Virginia and on the coast, I took the President's estimate of the largest number of re-enforcements that could then be sent to the Army of the Potomac.
On the day of my arrival at Harrison's Landing General McClellan was of opinion that he would require at least 50,000 additional troops. I informed him that this number could not possibly be sent; that I was not authorized to promise him over 20,000, and that I could not well see how even that number could be safely withdrawn from other places. He took the night for considering the matter, and informed me next morning that he would make the attempt upon Richmond with the additional 20,000; but immediately on my return to Washington he telegraphed that he would require 35,000--a force which it was impossible to send him without leaving Washington and Baltimore almost defenseless. The only alternative now left was to withdraw the Army of the Potomac to some position where it could unite with that of General Pope, and cover Washington at the same time that it operated against the enemy. After full consultation with my officers I determined to attempt this junction on the Rappahannock by bringing McClellan's forces to Aquia Creek. Accordingly, on the 30th of July, I telegraphed to him to send away his sick as quickly as possible, preparatory to a movement of his troops. This was preliminary to the withdrawal of his entire army, which was ordered by telegraph on the 3d of August. In order that the transfer to Aquia Creek might be made as rapidly as possible, I authorized General McClellan to assume control of all vessels in the James River and Chesapeake Bay, of which there was then a vast fleet. The Quartermaster-General was also requested to send to that point all the transports that could be procured.
On the 5th I received a protest from General McClellan, dated the 4th, against the removal of the army from Harrison's Landing; a copy of which is annexed, marked Exhibit No. 1, with my reply on the 6th, marked Exhibit No. 2.
On the 1st of August I ordered General Burnside to immediately embark his troops at Newport News, transfer them to Aquia Creek, and take position opposite Fredericksburg. This officer moved with great promptness, and reached Aquia Creek on the night of the 3d. His troops were immediately landed and the transports sent back to General McClellan.
About this time I received information that the enemy was preparing a large force to drive back General Pope and attack either Washington or Baltimore. The information was so direct and reliable that I could not doubt its correctness. This gave me serious uneasiness for the safety of the capital and Maryland, and I repeatedly urged upon General McClellan the necessity of promptly moving his army so as to form a junction with that of General Pope. The evacuation of Harrison's Landing, <ar16_6> however, was not commenced till the 14th, eleven days after it was ordered.
Greatly discouraged at the prospect of timely aid from that quarter, I authorized General Pope to order the main forces of General Cox in Western Virginia with all possible dispatch by railroad to join him via Washington.
To facilitate the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula and gain time by a demonstration against the enemy, General Pope pushed his forces across the Rappahannock, occupied Culpeper, and threatened Gordonsville. Jackson's and Ewell's forces were hurried to the Rapidan, and on the 9th of August encountered Banks' corps at Cedar Mountain. A hard-fought battle ensued, and on the arrival of re-enforcements from the corps of McDowell and Sigel the enemy fell back upon the Rapidan and Gordonsville.
On :he 15th our cavalry surprised a party of the enemy near Louisa Court-House and captured important dispatches, showing that Lee was moving by forced marches the main body of the rebel army to attack Pope before a junction could be formed between him and the Army of the Potomac.
On the 16th I telegraphed to General Pope not to cross the Rapidan, and advised him to take position in rear of the Rappahannock, where he could be more easily re-enforced. He commenced this movement on the 17th, and by the morning of the 18th had most of his forces behind that river, prepared to hold its passes as long as possible. He had been re-enforced by King's division and a part of Burnside's corps, under General Reno, from Fredericksburg. I also directed General Burnside to occupy Richards' and Barnett's Fords, which were between him and General Pope's main army. The enemy made several attempts to cross at different points on the Rappahannock, but was always repulsed, and our troops succeeded in holding the line of this river for eight days. It was hoped that during this time sufficient forces from the Army of the Potomac would reach Aquia Creek to enable us to prevent any farther advance of Lee, and eventually with the combined armies to drive him back upon Richmond.
On the 24th he made a flank movement, and crossed a portion of his forces at Waterloo Bridge, about 12 miles above the Rappahannock Railroad Station. Pope directed an attack upon the forces which had crossed the river, hoping to cut them off, but the enemy escaped with no great loss. The annexed telegram from General Pope, marked Exhibit No. 3, dated the 25th, gives his views of the condition of affairs at that date. The enemy, however, had not fallen back, as he supposed, but on being repulsed at Waterloo Bridge had moved farther up the river and entered the valley which lies between the Blue Ridge and Bull Run Mountains. The object of this movement was evidently to get in Pope's rear and cut off his supplies from Washington. Anticipating this danger, I had telegraphed to General Pope on the 23d, "By no means expose your railroad communication with Alexandria; it is of the utmost importance in sending you supplies and re-enforcements." On the 26th I telegraphed, "If possible to attack the enemy in flank, do so; but the main object now is to ascertain his position."
From this time till the 30th I had no communication with General Pope, the telegraph lines being cut at Kettle Run by a part of Jackson's corps under Ewell, which had marched around Pope's right and attacked his rear. Finding it doubtful whether we could hold the <ar16_7> Rappahannock long enough to effect the junction of the two armies, I had directed a part of the Peninsula forces to land at Alexandria and move out by railroad as rapidly as possible. As soon as I heard that the enemy had turned General Pope's right flank and forced him to change his front I ordered the remainder of the Army of the Potomac to Alexandria, and directed General Burnside to prepare to evacuate Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek. I determined, however, to hold this position as long as possible for a base of future operations.
General Pope's dispositions at this juncture were well planned. The corps of McDowell and Sigel, and the Pennsylvania Reserves, under Reynolds, were pushed forward to Gainesville. Reno and Kearny were directed upon Greenwich, while Hooker's division was sent against Ewell along the railroad. Unfortunately, however, the movement was too late, as a large detachment of Lee's army was already east of Thoroughfare Gap.
Hooker encountered the enemy near Kettle Run, and a sharp engagement ensued. This gallant division drove Ewell a distance of 5 miles, the enemy leaving their dead and many of their wounded on the field.
As McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds had reached their positions, there was now every prospect that Jackson would be destroyed before re-enforcements could come to his relief. On the evening of the 27th General Pope ordered General Porter to be at Bristoe Station by daylight on the morning of the 28th, with Morell, and also directed him to communicate to Banks the order to move forward to Warrenton Junction. All trains were ordered this side of Cedar Run, and to be protected by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery. For some unexplained reasons Porter did not comply with this order, and his corps was not in the battles of the 28th and 29th.
Heintzelman's corps pressed forward to Manassas on the morning of the 28th, and forced Jackson to retreat across Bull Run, by the Centreville turnpike. McDowell had succeeded in checking Lee at Thoroughfare Gap, but the latter took the road from Hopewell to New Market and hastened to the relief of Jackson, who was already in rapid retreat. A portion of McDowell's corps encountered the retreating column on the afternoon of the 28th near the Warrenton turnpike, and a severe but successful engagement ensued. Jackson was again attacked on the 29th, near the old battle-ground of July, 1861. Knowing that Longstreet was not distant, he made a most desperate stand. The fight continued nearly all day, and was terminated only by darkness. We had gained considerable ground, but nothing was decided when the battle closed. It was renewed the next morning, and after another day's hard fighting our forces fell back behind Bull Run, the enemy not attempting any pursuit. Two days later, however, he threw a considerable force between Chantilly and Germantown, to turn Pope's right. Hooker dislodged them, after a short but severe engagement, in which Brigadier-Generals Kearny and Stevens, two of our very best officers, were killed. Pope's army had been re-enforced by the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and no further apprehensions were felt for its safety.
During the operations of the previous week, of which we received very favorable but not reliable accounts, every effort was made to push forward supplies and re-enforcements to General Pope's army. The troops from the Peninsula were ordered not to wait for transportation, but to march immediately to the field of battle. Some of the corps <ar16_8> moved with becoming activity, but the delays of others were neither creditable nor excusable.
Our losses in these battles were very heavy both in life and materials, but as no official reports have been received, except a brief sketch from General Pope, marked Exhibit No. 4,(*) I have no means of ascertaining their extent. General Pope was transferred to another department before the reports of his subordinates could be received. Probably they will soon be handed in. Most of the troops actually engaged in these battles fought with great bravery, but some of them could not be brought into action at all. Many thousand straggled away from their commands, and it is said that not a few voluntarily surrendered to the enemy, so as to be paroled as prisoners of war.
In order to reorganize the different corps, get the stragglers back into their ranks, and to supply deficiencies of ammunition, clothing, &c., caused by recent losses, General Pope requested and received direct ions to bring his army within the defenses of Washington, which were then under the command of General McClellan. This movement was executed on the night of the 3d without loss. General Pope, being now second in command of the united forces, applied to be relieved, and was transferred to another department.
Although this short and active campaign was, from causes already referred to, less successful than we had reason to expect, it had accomplished the great and important object of covering the capital till troops could be collected for its defense. Had the Army of the Potomac arrived a few days earlier, the rebel army could have been easily defeated, and perhaps destroyed.
Seeing that an attack upon Washington would now be futile, Lee pushed his main army across the Potomac for a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. General McClellan was directed to pursue him with all the troops which were not required for the defense of Washington. Several corps were immediately thrown out in observation at Darnestown, Rockville, and Leesborough, and most of his army was in motion by the 5th of September. A portion of it entered Frederick on the 12th.
* * * * * * * * * *
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
March 17-September 2, 1862.
No. 1.--Extract from report of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, U. S. Army, General-in-Chief, of operations July 23--September 12.
HDQRS. OF THE ARMY, Washington, Nov. 25, 1862.
SIR: In compliance with your orders I have the honor to submit the following report of military operations since the 23d of July last, when, <ar16_5> in compliance with the President's order of July 11, I assumed the command of the Army as General-in-Chief.
The first thing to which my attention was called on my arrival here was the condition of the army at Harrison's Landing, on the James River. I immediately visited General McClellan's headquarters for consultation. I left Washington on the 24th and returned on the 27th. The main object of this consultation was to ascertain if there was a possibility of all advance upon Richmond from Harrison's Landing, and, if not, to form some plan of uniting the armies of General McClellan and General Pope on some other line. Not being familiar with the position and numbers of the troops in Virginia and on the coast, I took the President's estimate of the largest number of re-enforcements that could then be sent to the Army of the Potomac.
On the day of my arrival at Harrison's Landing General McClellan was of opinion that he would require at least 50,000 additional troops. I informed him that this number could not possibly be sent; that I was not authorized to promise him over 20,000, and that I could not well see how even that number could be safely withdrawn from other places. He took the night for considering the matter, and informed me next morning that he would make the attempt upon Richmond with the additional 20,000; but immediately on my return to Washington he telegraphed that he would require 35,000--a force which it was impossible to send him without leaving Washington and Baltimore almost defenseless. The only alternative now left was to withdraw the Army of the Potomac to some position where it could unite with that of General Pope, and cover Washington at the same time that it operated against the enemy. After full consultation with my officers I determined to attempt this junction on the Rappahannock by bringing McClellan's forces to Aquia Creek. Accordingly, on the 30th of July, I telegraphed to him to send away his sick as quickly as possible, preparatory to a movement of his troops. This was preliminary to the withdrawal of his entire army, which was ordered by telegraph on the 3d of August. In order that the transfer to Aquia Creek might be made as rapidly as possible, I authorized General McClellan to assume control of all vessels in the James River and Chesapeake Bay, of which there was then a vast fleet. The Quartermaster-General was also requested to send to that point all the transports that could be procured.
On the 5th I received a protest from General McClellan, dated the 4th, against the removal of the army from Harrison's Landing; a copy of which is annexed, marked Exhibit No. 1, with my reply on the 6th, marked Exhibit No. 2.
On the 1st of August I ordered General Burnside to immediately embark his troops at Newport News, transfer them to Aquia Creek, and take position opposite Fredericksburg. This officer moved with great promptness, and reached Aquia Creek on the night of the 3d. His troops were immediately landed and the transports sent back to General McClellan.
About this time I received information that the enemy was preparing a large force to drive back General Pope and attack either Washington or Baltimore. The information was so direct and reliable that I could not doubt its correctness. This gave me serious uneasiness for the safety of the capital and Maryland, and I repeatedly urged upon General McClellan the necessity of promptly moving his army so as to form a junction with that of General Pope. The evacuation of Harrison's Landing, <ar16_6> however, was not commenced till the 14th, eleven days after it was ordered.
Greatly discouraged at the prospect of timely aid from that quarter, I authorized General Pope to order the main forces of General Cox in Western Virginia with all possible dispatch by railroad to join him via Washington.
To facilitate the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula and gain time by a demonstration against the enemy, General Pope pushed his forces across the Rappahannock, occupied Culpeper, and threatened Gordonsville. Jackson's and Ewell's forces were hurried to the Rapidan, and on the 9th of August encountered Banks' corps at Cedar Mountain. A hard-fought battle ensued, and on the arrival of re-enforcements from the corps of McDowell and Sigel the enemy fell back upon the Rapidan and Gordonsville.
On :he 15th our cavalry surprised a party of the enemy near Louisa Court-House and captured important dispatches, showing that Lee was moving by forced marches the main body of the rebel army to attack Pope before a junction could be formed between him and the Army of the Potomac.
On the 16th I telegraphed to General Pope not to cross the Rapidan, and advised him to take position in rear of the Rappahannock, where he could be more easily re-enforced. He commenced this movement on the 17th, and by the morning of the 18th had most of his forces behind that river, prepared to hold its passes as long as possible. He had been re-enforced by King's division and a part of Burnside's corps, under General Reno, from Fredericksburg. I also directed General Burnside to occupy Richards' and Barnett's Fords, which were between him and General Pope's main army. The enemy made several attempts to cross at different points on the Rappahannock, but was always repulsed, and our troops succeeded in holding the line of this river for eight days. It was hoped that during this time sufficient forces from the Army of the Potomac would reach Aquia Creek to enable us to prevent any farther advance of Lee, and eventually with the combined armies to drive him back upon Richmond.
On the 24th he made a flank movement, and crossed a portion of his forces at Waterloo Bridge, about 12 miles above the Rappahannock Railroad Station. Pope directed an attack upon the forces which had crossed the river, hoping to cut them off, but the enemy escaped with no great loss. The annexed telegram from General Pope, marked Exhibit No. 3, dated the 25th, gives his views of the condition of affairs at that date. The enemy, however, had not fallen back, as he supposed, but on being repulsed at Waterloo Bridge had moved farther up the river and entered the valley which lies between the Blue Ridge and Bull Run Mountains. The object of this movement was evidently to get in Pope's rear and cut off his supplies from Washington. Anticipating this danger, I had telegraphed to General Pope on the 23d, "By no means expose your railroad communication with Alexandria; it is of the utmost importance in sending you supplies and re-enforcements." On the 26th I telegraphed, "If possible to attack the enemy in flank, do so; but the main object now is to ascertain his position."
From this time till the 30th I had no communication with General Pope, the telegraph lines being cut at Kettle Run by a part of Jackson's corps under Ewell, which had marched around Pope's right and attacked his rear. Finding it doubtful whether we could hold the <ar16_7> Rappahannock long enough to effect the junction of the two armies, I had directed a part of the Peninsula forces to land at Alexandria and move out by railroad as rapidly as possible. As soon as I heard that the enemy had turned General Pope's right flank and forced him to change his front I ordered the remainder of the Army of the Potomac to Alexandria, and directed General Burnside to prepare to evacuate Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek. I determined, however, to hold this position as long as possible for a base of future operations.
General Pope's dispositions at this juncture were well planned. The corps of McDowell and Sigel, and the Pennsylvania Reserves, under Reynolds, were pushed forward to Gainesville. Reno and Kearny were directed upon Greenwich, while Hooker's division was sent against Ewell along the railroad. Unfortunately, however, the movement was too late, as a large detachment of Lee's army was already east of Thoroughfare Gap.
Hooker encountered the enemy near Kettle Run, and a sharp engagement ensued. This gallant division drove Ewell a distance of 5 miles, the enemy leaving their dead and many of their wounded on the field.
As McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds had reached their positions, there was now every prospect that Jackson would be destroyed before re-enforcements could come to his relief. On the evening of the 27th General Pope ordered General Porter to be at Bristoe Station by daylight on the morning of the 28th, with Morell, and also directed him to communicate to Banks the order to move forward to Warrenton Junction. All trains were ordered this side of Cedar Run, and to be protected by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery. For some unexplained reasons Porter did not comply with this order, and his corps was not in the battles of the 28th and 29th.
Heintzelman's corps pressed forward to Manassas on the morning of the 28th, and forced Jackson to retreat across Bull Run, by the Centreville turnpike. McDowell had succeeded in checking Lee at Thoroughfare Gap, but the latter took the road from Hopewell to New Market and hastened to the relief of Jackson, who was already in rapid retreat. A portion of McDowell's corps encountered the retreating column on the afternoon of the 28th near the Warrenton turnpike, and a severe but successful engagement ensued. Jackson was again attacked on the 29th, near the old battle-ground of July, 1861. Knowing that Longstreet was not distant, he made a most desperate stand. The fight continued nearly all day, and was terminated only by darkness. We had gained considerable ground, but nothing was decided when the battle closed. It was renewed the next morning, and after another day's hard fighting our forces fell back behind Bull Run, the enemy not attempting any pursuit. Two days later, however, he threw a considerable force between Chantilly and Germantown, to turn Pope's right. Hooker dislodged them, after a short but severe engagement, in which Brigadier-Generals Kearny and Stevens, two of our very best officers, were killed. Pope's army had been re-enforced by the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and no further apprehensions were felt for its safety.
During the operations of the previous week, of which we received very favorable but not reliable accounts, every effort was made to push forward supplies and re-enforcements to General Pope's army. The troops from the Peninsula were ordered not to wait for transportation, but to march immediately to the field of battle. Some of the corps <ar16_8> moved with becoming activity, but the delays of others were neither creditable nor excusable.
Our losses in these battles were very heavy both in life and materials, but as no official reports have been received, except a brief sketch from General Pope, marked Exhibit No. 4,(*) I have no means of ascertaining their extent. General Pope was transferred to another department before the reports of his subordinates could be received. Probably they will soon be handed in. Most of the troops actually engaged in these battles fought with great bravery, but some of them could not be brought into action at all. Many thousand straggled away from their commands, and it is said that not a few voluntarily surrendered to the enemy, so as to be paroled as prisoners of war.
In order to reorganize the different corps, get the stragglers back into their ranks, and to supply deficiencies of ammunition, clothing, &c., caused by recent losses, General Pope requested and received direct ions to bring his army within the defenses of Washington, which were then under the command of General McClellan. This movement was executed on the night of the 3d without loss. General Pope, being now second in command of the united forces, applied to be relieved, and was transferred to another department.
Although this short and active campaign was, from causes already referred to, less successful than we had reason to expect, it had accomplished the great and important object of covering the capital till troops could be collected for its defense. Had the Army of the Potomac arrived a few days earlier, the rebel army could have been easily defeated, and perhaps destroyed.
Seeing that an attack upon Washington would now be futile, Lee pushed his main army across the Potomac for a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. General McClellan was directed to pursue him with all the troops which were not required for the defense of Washington. Several corps were immediately thrown out in observation at Darnestown, Rockville, and Leesborough, and most of his army was in motion by the 5th of September. A portion of it entered Frederick on the 12th.
* * * * * * * * * *
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
